

Mass Media Assessment

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

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Executive Summary

This report is the product of a four week assessment of the media situation and USAID-funded media programs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan that took place between September 24 and October 17, 2003. The assessment was a joint effort undertaken by Democracy Advisor for Media, Political Processes, and Human Rights at USAID/CAR, Sean R. Roberts, and the Media Advisor for USAID/DCHA, Mark Koenig. In each country, this core assessment team was assisted by the USAID country staff working on media projects. In each country, the assessment team met with local independent media outlets, the staff of Internews and other media partners, citizen focus groups, donors, and U.S. government officials.

In general, the assessment team found that the situation in Central Asia for independent media was critical and that the availability of diverse and relevant information on economic, political, and economic issues was significantly restricted. While the Internews program has had an important and positive impact on the situation of independent media in the region, especially under its existing agreement with USAID/CAR, it was determined that the situation in the region requires new creative approaches that push the envelope on the availability of information more aggressively. While it was determined that USAID/CAR must work towards both the short term goal of increased availability of information and the long term goal of a more sustainable independent media sector, it is recommended that the former short term goal should be the first priority. In particular, USAID/CAR must avoid the pitfall of supporting the sustainability of a “private” non-independent media sector that is beholden to the region’s entrenched elites.

Given that USAID/CAR is presently considering the design of its follow-on project for media in the region, the assessment team has provides recommendations for a new project design as the initial section of the report. This is followed by four in-depth reviews of the media and information situation in each country for those interested in the information upon which these recommendations are based.

Recommendations

Given the impulse of the governments in the region to monopolize and control independent media, we generally recommend that USAID/CAR prioritize its efforts in the media sector to promote the short-term increase in the availability of information first and to try to help the sector become sustainable second. In particular, the Mission must be careful not to help create a sustainable media sector that is beholden to the region's entrenched elites. Such a scenario, which is entirely plausible in present conditions, would only make the development of an independent media sector in the future more difficult to facilitate. To avoid such a scenario, USAID must provide more targeted assistance to those individuals in the media news and information world that are pushing the envelope. At the same time, it also requires USAID taking on the sponsorship of more information production. This is important because such programming may have more "political cover" if it is sponsored by USAID than if it is perceived as exclusively the initiative of a local media outlet. Unfortunately, even such productions that are underwritten by USAID will likely be hindered by self-censorship in the present context since there remain numerous *taboo* issues that will not be tolerated by the host governments, even if they are sponsored by the U.S. government. Nonetheless, hopefully such programming can gradually "raise the bar" of what is tolerable to host governments. While the most important goal of such programming will be providing more diverse and quality information to the people of Central Asia, it should also be the intention of USAID/CAR to demonstrate to host governments in the region that freedom of information is not a threat to stability. To the contrary, an informed citizenry should help the development of their respective countries, and a poorly informed populous will only retard that development.

If the short-term goal of increasing the availability of diverse information sources in Central Asia should be the Mission's first priority, USAID/CAR should also support progressive elements within the media sector in order to build their capacity and ensure that they remain active in this sector for the long term. Given the tenuous situation of most independent journalists and media outlets at present, pulling out support for the establishment and sustenance of independent media could have disastrous results. It is important, therefore, that USAID/CAR's new media program concentrate more resources on building up local capacity in both training and advocacy to help sustain the development of independent media as international attention to Central Asia gradually decreases along with the budgets of international organizations. This translates into the need to locally institutionalize training for journalists and media professionals as well as to more actively support the organizational development of media advocacy and legal defense organizations. Furthermore, in providing training to media professionals, it is important that any USAID project carefully focus more on those recipients who are likely to remain committed to independent media and less on the media institutions themselves, which are always open to buy-out by individuals more interested in monopolizing information. In doing so, it is also important that the skills conveyed to the appropriate recipients include those needed to run media outlets as a business as well as those needed to provide independent and objective information through the media.

Below, we provide more detailed recommendations for the new approach that USAID/CAR should undertake. It is divided into regional initiatives relevant to all countries and a set of separate recommendations for approaches that are country specific.

Regional Initiatives:

Since three of the most glaring problems that the assessment team found in each country were the lack of quality and balanced informational programming that pushes the envelope (especially on television), the lack of any institutionalization of media training locally, and the overwhelming need for better media advocacy and legal defense, we recommend that a new project be founded on three significant regional initiatives addressing these problems. They are:

- 1) “*Central Asian Institute of the Fourth Estate.*” This would be a regional training institute and possibly an advocacy vehicle located ideally in Bishkek, where the government might be amenable to its existence. In the long term, its primary role would be to institutionalize training regionally. Implementers and other donors could offer seminars there and invite journalists and media professionals from around the region. A mix of paid seminars and scholarships might defray costs (Kazakhstan media, for example, might often pay their own way). Eventually, it could also be used as a basis for an accredited MA in media management and/or journalism. It could also be a place for public forums on media and information issues as well as potentially a site for advocacy groups that could address media law and the rights of journalists. Initially, however, its primary role would be that of coordinating local training providers in each country (which an implementer would be asked to identify), providing training to local trainers on the most basic needs of journalists and media professionals while hosting regional seminars themselves on more advanced subjects. It may also be a vehicle for an annual regional conference/workshop for journalists and media professionals from around the region.
This training institution would also need to fulfill two general tasks during the period of the new media project. First, it would need to ensure that media training continued to serve the appropriate recipients without much of a time gap at the onset of the project. Second, it would continually work on a plan to institutionalize and sustain training in the region after the end of the program. Such a three-year plan probably could not realistically provide for financial sustainability without grant support, but it should at least include clear movement towards a diversification of donors and the development of a locally based and managed institution that is capable of providing the needed services and that is committed to the ideal of an independent media that is respected by citizens as being non-partisan and effective in providing information
- 2) “*Central Asian Television Production.*” The assessment team identified the development of a mechanism to produce and distribute television programming for rebroadcast on independent stations throughout the region as a high priority. Ideally, this would be transmitted via satellite since this would have several advantages from a financial and logistical point of view as well as potentially numerous residual benefits. It is envisioned that USAID/CAR and its implementer would identify several programmatic priorities including different talk shows and news programs that could have regional benefit. While an implementer may manage the production of some of these in the way that Internews has managed the production of country and regional news exchanges, much of the programming would be solicited from local sources through an RFP that could ensure more control over the project. The programs could be both regional and country specific in scope given that the assessment team found that people in Central Asia are generally interested in the events taking place in the region since they no longer receive information from elsewhere in Central Asia. Additionally, the satellite transmission could re-broadcast the best talk shows from the region in agreement with

independent stations. This would maximize limited resources and provide a larger pool of programming for rebroadcast.

The provision of this programming to independent stations is important for several reasons. Firstly, we have found that such programming produced with USAID funding through Internews and NDI in the past has been able to push the envelope on hard-hitting news and are less beholden to self-censorship. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of television programming on independent stations in the region is presently re-transmitted material from Russian television. As a result, the people of Central Asia get more information about Russia than they do about neighboring countries, and the information they receive has already been influenced by the power structures in Russia, who presently have tight control over the larger Russian networks. This is particularly disconcerting in the context of international news programming, which is inevitably produced from the point of view of Russian state interests. As a result of Russian news programming on the recent Georgian “Rose Revolution,” for example, most Central Asians assume that these events have negative connotations and are creating disorder, rather than more representational governance, in Georgia. Given that most independent stations can only produce a handful of their own programming each day, however, they have no choice but to rebroadcast material from Russia. If USAID is able to fund programming for rebroadcast that is transmitted by satellite (stations now download satellite transmissions of Russian television), this will provide stations with another alternative for at least some of their programming.

To facilitate this retransmission, an implementer would enter into contractual agreements with independent stations that would allow them to re-broadcast free of charge as long as they air a stipulated number of the informational programs each week. Given the political difficulties associated with self-censorship in the region, however, it should be realized that many stations cannot broadcast all of the programs produced. It may the case, for example, that what is permissible to show in Kyrgyzstan cannot be shown in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, as added incentive to broadcast material, there should be a grant fund for equipment available to those stations that prove the best partners in each country. As a residual benefit, this satellite transmitted material will be available to the many people in Central Asia with home satellite dishes and receivers. This will be of particular importance in Turkmenistan where the lack of any independent media has forced all those who can afford such dishes to purchase them. At present in Turkmenistan, however, the only viewing option on satellite, if viewers know only Turkmen and Russian languages, are Russian and Turkish channels (Turkmen is mostly mutually intelligible with Turkish). The material broadcast under this project could offer them an important third alternative that focuses specifically on Central Asia.

The implementation of such a project needs to be carefully planned. First, a feasibility study must be done that examines what satellite providers can offer space that reaches those receivers that local independent stations and individuals own in Central Asia. An initial inquiry in Kazakhstan suggested that space on a satellite through a company in Almaty would cost \$150/hour and could reach all of Central Asia. This must, however, be further investigated as should Russian-based operations. Finally, a contingency plan needs to be in place to facilitate production tape exchanges if the development of a satellite transmitted option proves either politically or logistically impossible.

Also, any potential implementer will need to solicit donations of programming with entertainment value—documentaries, films, etc. This might be done, for example, through seeking assistance from private media producers in the United States, and the

project implementer could be responsible for translation. Such programs will be important in getting local independent stations to broadcast the satellite material since entertainment programming is likely to still occupy the majority of the broadcast schedule on any independent television station given that it remains the most attractive material for viewers. Finally, given that the station will, in part, focus on informing satellite owners in Turkmenistan, at least one weekly informational and/or talk show on Turkmenistan will need to be produced if money can be attained from the Turkmenistan budget for the project. This will be a challenge given that Turkmen within the borders of Turkmenistan are unlikely to be willing to participate. More generally, a good plan for programmatic production will also need to take into account language issues. While most people in the region understand Russian sufficiently enough to watch television in that language, local media laws and political issues may require more use of local official state languages. If this is done, producing the programs with Russian sub-titles may still make the programs of interest to viewers and stations in other countries.

Finally, the implementation of this project will require a sustainability plan. While the initial goals of the project are short-term and can be completely funded by donors, attention must also be paid to the long-term sustainability of the services that the station will provide the region. This may be less ambitious than it initially seems. Given that all independent stations in the region need to re-broadcast externally produced products in order to fill their schedules, there is a niche that this station could fill. While the assessment team found that most stations in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were not presently paying for the re-broadcasting of Russian television, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan they are paying nominal fees. In this context, if the satellite station could compete with Russian stations, it may be able to eventually move to a subscriber system. Initially, however, the station should at least try to immediately begin seeking other donor support (even for single programs) to diversify its funding. Likewise, if the use of the satellite is purchased by the hour, the station could easily develop a fee scale for each program, allowing other donors and/or other USAID programs to buy into the project by broadcasting more specific programming that meets their objectives.

3) *Media Advocacy Network.* At present, USAID funds a small regional media monitoring project that is implemented by Adil Soz of Kazakhstan with the assistance of partners in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This program may need to be expanded to entail more active advocacy and legal support. Adil Soz has already based its mission largely on the Glasnost' Defense Fund in Moscow, which includes an emphasis on both advocacy and legal defense as well as on media monitoring. This aspect of Adil Soz's program might be further supported, and a transfer of skills in these areas could be funded among Adil Soz's partners in other countries. Furthermore, USAID/CAR might fund a more proactive media advocacy campaign focused on promoting the concept of media as the "fourth estate" in a democratic society. Such a campaign would be intended to move advocacy away from a mode of "responding to crises" and hopefully give free media advocates an upper hand in the discourse on media generally. It would be especially useful if this project was led by an expatriate who has experience with media law and could help build the capacity of media lawyers and possibly could assist in legislative drafting and in providing commentary on media legislation. This coordinator could be affiliated with the training institute as well since this institute could also help provide technical assistance and training to advocacy and legal defense groups.

Country-Specific Approaches:

While these three regional projects are critical in each country, they may need to employ different tactics given that independent media also has specific problems in each country. Below are some suggestions for specific approaches appropriate in the different countries where the project would operate.

Kazakhstan

- There must be a forum for discussing the role of media in society, perhaps facilitated by media advocacy groups. This could include issues of legislation, the role of journalists in political, economic, and social life, journalistic ethics, and issues of the concentration of media ownership. Likewise, a television talk show on this theme would offer a means for generating public discussion and could be distributed through the satellite transmission.
- Radio should be explored more thoroughly since it is still virgin territory. This could be done by seeking out radio professionals for training both in talk radio and in radio business. Radio stations may also consider re-broadcasting the sound of certain talk shows provided by the satellite station. If they would do this, they could also qualify for the equipment grants program.
- Newspapers should be supported perhaps slightly more than at present (mostly through training). It appears that newspapers are beginning to divide along political party lines in the country allowing them a financial base, but journalists need assistance as well as managers and advertising offices. They may also be important clients of any legal defense program.
- The possibility of another media baron emerging in the market must be watched closely and we should respond appropriately if this creates healthy competition.
- Advocacy campaigns might focus on the benefits of a free commercial media for economic development writ large. This could be stimulated by a conference on this subject, and it might be beneficial to approach The World Bank about co-financing such a conference.

Kyrgyzstan

- The idea of attracting Kazakh advertisers to the Kyrgyz media market should be examined.
- Radio must be explored, especially for regions outside the center. In this area, the same approach as in Kazakhstan should be examined.
- Newspapers should be receiving more assistance. This includes work with journalists, but also management training and training for advertising. It may also be important to work on newspaper distribution systems, perhaps with the assistance of the Freedom House printing press program.
- As in Kazakhstan, there is a need for more public discussion of the role of media in society. A particular focus on preventing media monopolies may be especially fruitful for pro-active advocacy campaigns since the monopolization of private media in Kyrgyzstan has not progressed as far as in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan

- A top priority would be the network of independent TV stations that is now being considered—the satellite transmission could help extensively by providing the network with a base of shared programming.

- It likely makes sense to do more with radio. Radio Grande in Tashkent has been quite effective, and there may be room for more stations to receive assistance.
- Newspapers are not extremely effective means of conveying news, but there are a couple that should be supported. It may also be explored whether it makes sense to help one investigative journalist with whom we met in his attempts to start a new newspaper.
- Investigative journalism training would be important in all media sectors.
- Media advocacy in Uzbekistan needs to be broadened. This will be challenging considering the general hard line that the Uzbek government has taken with regards to both independent media and civic advocacy. An approach must be contemplated that will not create a boomerang effect and lead to further repression of independent media outlets.

Tajikistan

- There appears to be a potential opportunity to work with several independent TV stations to establish a network (at first in the north). This should be assisted and provided with programming from the satellite transmission.
- The issue of attracting advertisers from Russia and Kazakhstan might be examined.
- There is particularly fertile field for radio and newspaper assistance. This should include a strong element of attracting advertising.
- Push for the registration of Asia Plus as a TV station, and if it fails, the studio we previously funded at Asia Plus could be one of the major partners in the satellite transmission programming production.
- Community radio should be explored as an alternative information source in poor and remote areas. If there are shows on the TV satellite transmission that can be rebroadcast on radio, these stations could rebroadcast them (and maybe have a television with dish available for local citizens to watch the satellite programming?)
- Advocacy must focus extensively on the legislative basis for free media. The legal environment for media in Tajikistan is probably the worst in the region outside Turkmenistan. This should involve a concerted effort focused on better facilitation of registration, a reduction of the many hindrances to running media as a business, and safeguards against monopolies and the repression of journalists.

Turkmenistan

- As noted above in the section concerning the satellite transmission, at least one special informational talk show a week must be developed for Turkmenistan and broadcast on the satellite station. This will be a challenge. On the one hand, the show needs to provide discussion on events in Turkmenistan from different points of view without appearing to be in support of any specific exiled opposition group. On the other hand, it will be next to impossible to find participants within Turkmenistan. One option would be to engage the Soros Open Society Institute as a partner for this show since they already produce a monthly news capsule about Turkmenistan that is distributed on internet. The show could begin with news from this service and invite figures from elsewhere in Central Asia to discuss specific news items. The show might be in Russian with Turkmen subtitles.
- It will be important to make sure that the many satellite dishes and receivers in Turkmenistan can receive the satellite station. It is also important that people are aware of the stations existence without bringing too much attention to it from the side of the government.

In addition to these recommendations about the regional bases of a new project and the specific approaches appropriate for each country, the assessment team had some additional recommendations concerning coordination between donors and synergies within the USAID/CAR's programs as well as with regards to procurement mechanisms.

Donor Coordination and Synergies within the USAID/CAR programs

- The assessment team found several instances of a lack of donor coordination in the media sector. While some of this may be unavoidable, some of it can be alleviated. First, it is essential that the USAID program seek to get other donors involved in the training institute and the satellite transmission project. If there is an involvement of other donors in these two institutions, it should limit the lack of coordination on production and training issues while bolstering the strength of these projects.
- There are several synergies within the different sectors of USAID/CAR's programs that could benefit independent media. Many programs in the Enterprise and Finance as well as Health sector presently do social marketing through state, or quasi-state, television, something for which they often pay high prices. If PSAs and programs usually paid for on state-controlled television (due to larger audiences) could be attracted to the satellite transmission programming project, it could help fill the schedule on the satellite transmission while ensuring a large regional reach for USAID informational campaigns.
- Additionally, it would be extremely beneficial to independent media if SME programs funded through the Enterprise and Finance office of USAID/CAR were to work more with independent media as SMEs. Furthermore, it would be helpful if SME programs worked with other SMEs to illustrate the advantages of advertisement.
- Finally, the DM office at USAID/CAR should encourage the new regional civic advocacy project to engage media advocacy NGOs and assist them with organizational development and advocacy skills.

I. Kazakhstan Media

1.1 General Situation:

Kazakhstan poses some paradoxical contrasts compared to its Central Asian neighbors, insofar as its media system in the early 1990s progressed to relatively higher levels of independent professionalism and economic self-sustainability, yet has throttled backward since the mid-1990s by equally significant reversals against press freedoms. The Kazakh economy is also stronger and more diversified than the neighboring economies, which creates some space for partially responding to negative political trends in the media sector.

The disparity between the promising potential of Kazakhstan's emerging media system -- versus troubling setbacks after 1996 -- is best analyzed on a sector by sector basis. The television, radio, newspaper and media advocacy sectors are analyzed below.

1.2 Television:

Similar to developments to the north in Russia, an independent (non-state) television industry grew with remarkable speed in Kazakhstan in the early 1990s. Starting from zero in 1990-91, the number of privately-owned TV stations exceeded 50 by late 1996, with seven non-state studios in Almaty alone. Market conditions for television during this initial period were modestly favorable, featuring: low start-up and operating costs; audiences that responded well to newer, freer post-Soviet formats, and a relatively permissive regulatory/political climate. In 1992, Internews (with USAID support) began training a progressively widening cadre of TV producers -- and catalyzed greater private TV studio growth through media business management training, advertising department development support, and TV program exchanges. Nearly 30 stations were producing regular newscasts by 1997, and private broadcasters were rapidly overtaking the previously dominant state monopoly TV networks in viewer ratings and market shares.

Taking note of these developments, the Government of Kazakhstan launched after 1996 a sustained process of retaking (direct or indirect) ownership of stations (especially through re-licensing under conditions highly favorable to state-dominated interests) and subjected non-state TV stations to increasingly comprehensive controls and political/economic pressures.

The most striking aspect of the GOK recapture of the TV industry was, and remains, the impressive concentration of media properties in the hands of family members of President Nursultan Nazarbaev and the rise of his daughter, Dariga Nazarbaeva, to become Kazakhstan's preeminent media magnate. In addition to the Khabar News Agency, two radio stations, newspapers, and other media properties, Dariga's empire (directly or indirectly) controls six of Kazakhstan's nine television networks that broadcast in multiple locations:

- 1) *Khabar*, a "public-private" network broadcasting in Kazakh.
- 2) *El Arna*, a Russian language, commercial network
- 3) *Eurasia*, Russia's ORT adapted to Central Asia
- 4) NTK, a youth channel
- 5) *Caspio Net*
- 6) *KTK*, a former opposition station bought out by Dariga's media conglomerate.

Supplementing Dariga Nazarbaeva's six television networks, Kazakh citizens enjoy access to three other networks -- of which two are directly or indirectly State-controlled and only one, Channel 31, enjoys at least limited forms of independence:

- 7) Kazakhstan State Television, owned and fully controlled by the GOK
- 8) *Rahkat*, tied to state interests
- 9) Channel “31”: a small network with 30 affiliates, of which 8 are owned by the parent station of Channel “31.”

In addition, the Astana-based ASTV also recently received a license to broadcast nationally. The ownership of this station remains murky, but it appears to also be solidly controlled by somebody very important in the government or in the President’s family. It might be wryly observed (except for the partially autonomous Channel 31) that much of the competition or “pluralism” in the television, media and advertising industries remains contained within the orbit of the first family. Two presidential son-in-laws, Rahkat Aliev and Timur Kulibaev, have also accumulated significant print and broadcast media holdings. Kulibaev recently sought to introduce a serious competitive challenge for Dariga Nazerbaeva – his media holding company, through KazMunaiGaz, requested a license to launch a proposed new network to air a Kazakhstan version of the Russian channel “NTV” nationwide. While he was initially refused this nationwide license in favor of Astana’s ASTV, he may continue to revive this idea, which apparently is solidly backed by NTV and its parent company, the Russian Gas company GazProm.

National-level mechanisms for controlling television are replicated in greater or lesser ways at the local level. In addition to retaining local government ownership over many municipal and regional state media, many presidentially-appointed *akims* and local governments have acquired direct and/or indirect (proxy) control over other, sometimes previously independent local television stations and other media. For example, shortly after his appointment in 2002, the new *akim* in Aktyubinsk resolved to get direct control over a popular local station, *RIKA TV*, and forced the founder to sell his shares. The previously independent *RIKA TV* thus fell under the effective control of the *akimat*. Interestingly, the founder of *RIKA* then took his capital assets and launched a new, independent station in Astana (See references to *Era TV*, below). Likewise, in Shymkent we heard rumors that *Otyrar TV*, which was previously one of the strongest and hardest hitting local independent stations, was now owned at least partially by somebody high in the Kazakh security organs. This also appeared to be at least partially influencing its programming, which seems to be getting softer (See references to *Otyrar TV* below).

Despite the almost comprehensive sweep of direct State and proxy ownership and/or control of the television industry and other media, a minimal degree of permissible media independence in Kazakhstan – combined with richer economic opportunities – leaves some limited space for growth by cautiously independent local stations as well as networked quasi-independent television companies (currently only Channel 31). The evaluation team visited Internews/Kazakhstan in Almaty plus seven sampled TV stations in four cities; and we observed station situations ranging from state-dominated to cautiously independent, described in more detail below.

In Almaty, the director of Channel 31, Armanshan Baitasov, described conditions for television news reporting as: *de jure* free, but *de facto* avoiding sensitive issues (which he avoided listing). Channel 31 newscasts air eight times daily, and might be characterized as cautiously independent – covering some difficult issues of the day, but not the most politically sensitive issues. This pattern of cautiously independent reporting was repeated among most non-state media we visited, with each station adapted individually to its local city circumstances. In terms of business conditions, Baitasov believes that the Kazakh TV and media ad markets remain narrow, yet posed for significant growth. Lowered VAT rates for media through 2003 helped independent media accumulate sufficient capital resources to purchase needed equipment, but the scheduled end of that tax advantage in 2004 will complicate further growth. Available loan

terms have interest rates too high, and terms too short, to facilitate significant capital infusions. On balance (except for political limitations), overall market/economic conditions would seem to offer the “independent” (non-state) broadcast media industry good prospects for modest growth.

In Karaganda, three non-state channels (plus a city/oblast station) serve 500,000 local viewers. The longest established commercial channel is “5th Channel” (*Pyatii Kanal*), founded in 1993 as a private-public company (15% oblast- and 85% privately-owned). 5th Channel aired an impressive number of self-produced TV programs including 45 minutes of daily news and commentary, an audience participatory / public affairs talk show called “Open Microphone”, a press review and two religious programs (Orthodox as well as Muslim). Station director Elena Strochkova said that probing, critical reporting in newscasts is permissible if conducted professionally and accurately.

Two recently-launched TV stations, *Art TeleKanal* (described below in radio section) and a new Karaganda affiliate studio for Channel 31, both showed promising prospects for future development. Although Channel 31’s affiliate lacked sufficient equipment, having suffered a studio break-in and theft of its cameras and editing equipment in June, sample episodes from its ten minute daily newscast “Inform Buro” showed persistent digging for facts and good depth of analysis by the news team – for example – in coverage of procedural violations during recent local elections. While *Art TV* had yet to begin airing its own news programming, its young founders had already proved to be creative and hard-hitting in their radio programming. *Art Telekanal*, that retransmits the national channel *Rahkat* in addition to the still minimal self-produced programming, has already obtained ratings as high as 22% of local audience share.

Visits to a pair of stations in Astana revealed a comparative snapshot of two contrasting models for “privately-owned” media: state-coopted “private” television exemplified by ASTV, and partially independent television (ERA TV). As much as these two stations seem diverse, they also share cordially competitive relations, cooperating in such areas as joint purchases of scientific polling research of local TV viewers.

ASTV is owned by Astana Finance, a local real estate and energy holding company linked to a former akim, with other evidently unnamed owners who are likely very connected to the highest level of government. In the past two years, Astana-Finance invested \$3.5 - \$4.0 million into ASTV, which built large, beautiful, digitally equipped studios with the best lighting and staging available. The station is not yet generating sufficient revenues, so its future profitability remains uncertain; and its staff, modestly paid. The station director frankly declared ASTV’s editorial line to be “gosudarstvennoe” or (roughly translated) “generally supportive of the government”. ASTV is positioning itself to create a national network, which would add greater “northern capital” perspective to the menu of national channels, and it has already received a license to realize this plan. While lacking much independence, ASTV produces programs at a technically impressive level, including live newscasts five times daily, a talk show called “Real Talk” and a range of other public affairs programs.

ERA TV exemplifies a lower cost, more business savvy and more independent approach to television broadcasting in Astana. Launched in July with less than \$500,000 start-up capital (mainly earnings from the forced sale of RIKa TV in Aktyubinsk noted above), ERA designed an efficient modern newsroom, plus a small studio. Cost cutting even included the use of recycled egg cartons for sound proofing – a charming detail compared to the costlier, state-of-the-art German sound proofing at ASTV. ERA Director Kunbaev and ten colleagues previously at RIKa formed the management team, providing production, marketing and advertising know-how for the new station. The advertising department, in particular, already developed relations with over 50 SME clients in Astana. In effect, the commercial and production know-how from

earlier Internews training programs moved from RIKA TV in Aktyubinsk to Astana, demonstrating the mobility of trained independent media talent. Although obvious restrictions exist, ERA's director believes space exists under current Kazakh media conditions for local TV newscasts to constructively analyze many difficult issues. This station should prove well-positioned to probe the limits of permissible journalism in Astana, complementing the reporting of ASTV and other stations in the capital.

In Shimkent, a long established non-state station, *Telekompaniya Otyrar* appears to have lost some of its prior editorial independence due to a recent shift in ownership. *Otyrar* continues to air *Aina*, Internews' weekly current affairs program, and, evidently, to more or less maintain the professional level of its program production through its participation in Internews training activities. The station manager made constructive suggestions how to improve ongoing technical assistance, so the evaluation team assumes that Internews will remain engaged with *Otyrar* insofar as circumstances permit. On a brighter note, the evaluation team visited the quite independent and successful Shimkent newspaper, *Aigak*, which declared its intention to launch a new private television in Shimkent. Should the *Aigak* television project come to fruition, its broadcasts could prospectively compensate for the recent curtailment of *Otyrar's* reporting independence.

In short, there are rays of hope for the continuance of independent television on a regional level. By approaching the news from the local level, these stations can often provide a plurality of information on the social, economic, and political events effecting people in Kazakhstan. It should be noted, however, that the majority of the air time on such regional stations contains rebroadcasted material from Russia. This is an important phenomenon in terms of Kazakhstan's vision of global events, which are almost always seen through a Russian prism. Given that Putin's Russia has greatly turned back the clock in the development of independent television in that country, this is also an issue of significant concern. An example of how this impacts Kazakhstan's viewership is the recent "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, which was critically covered by Russian television. As a result, most Kazakhstanis have been left with an impression that this event was largely negative for Georgians and has destabilized the country. While this perspective is within the possible interpretations of the events in Georgia, it is far from the only interpretation of those events.

1.3 Radio:

USAID/CAR media development programs have not targeted the radio due to limited funds and evidence that radio widely ranks third in informational sources for people in the region (see Appendices E-H). This sector, however, may offer interesting prospects. Radio is considerably cheaper to produce than television, so relatively low budget programs could potentially make large contributions towards expanding media choices and pluralism in Kazakh media markets.

Although the evaluation team visited a single radio station in Kazakhstan, *Radio Tekes* in Karaganda, this site visit illustrated the large potentials offered by radio broadcasting to disseminate news and information to Kazakh citizens -- and to help activate citizen participation. *Radio Tekes* airs short newscasts eleven times daily. A morning talk show is primarily entertainment-oriented; but the Monday-Friday evening talk show entitled "Na Vash Vzglyad" (Your Opinion) allows radio listeners to phone in comments about a wide range of public issues that concern them. Perhaps most interesting was a 6 week "get-out-the-vote" multi-media campaign that *Radio Tekes* together with *Art TV* (its newly opened television station—see more above) conducted during recent elections. Partly as the result of this civic communications campaign, election turn-out in Karaganda reached 49% compared to 15-20% in

many other cities. *Radio Tekst*'s mix of music, news and light as well as serious discussion formats proved a popular formula for Karagandan listeners: *Radio Tekst* ranks second in popularity ratings among five radio stations serving this city.

1.4 Newspapers:

Print media titles outnumber broadcast outlets in Kazakhstan by almost eight-to-one: (1,237 newspapers vs. 162 electronic media as of October, 2003). The larger number of print media potentially opens opportunities for more pluralism of sources for readers, although the permitted degree of diversity among Kazakh print media is limited and fragile.

In Almaty, according to the editor of *Epokha*, a (restrained) partisan press system has begun to emerge. *Epokha*, for example, was founded in July, 2002, by the Rukhanyat Democracy School as an editorially independent weekly newspaper with a current circulation reaching 10-15,000; but the paper also serves as an "information partner" for the *Ak Zhol* Party. *Epokha*'s editor, Dr. Telegen Askarov, predicts that party-supported newspapers represent the wave of the future for Kazakhstan: papers such as *Epokha* can reach profitability and economic self-sustainability by using Party subsidies to supplement copy sales, subscriptions, and advertisements (although *Epokha* does not appear to carry much advertising).

Trace elements of an alternative "democratic/market oriented" model for newspaper development can still be found in Almaty and other cities: i.e., privately-owned papers (not owned by members or friends of the President's family) which seek to increase readership and profitability through a combination of cautious, but more or less objective reporting, sizable circulations, kiosk sales, subscriptions, and advertising sales.

The Almaty newspaper *Panorama* has grown its circulation from 4,000 copies weekly in 1992 to 20,000 copies weekly by 2003, and sells about 10% of its column space to advertising, thereby achieving modest profitability. *Panorama* attempts to provide objective coverage of multiple points of view, but the editor acknowledges that she and most other newspapers must steer clear of serious investigative journalism, since deeper journalistic probing is both costly and dangerous.

Still more impressive is the independent Kazakh-language newspaper, *Aigak*, successfully growing its circulation in the Shimkent region from 3,000 in 1996 to 60,000 currently. Majority-owned by its energetic editor, Dulat Abish, the paper's journalistic collective (some journalists are also co-owners) understood that a newspaper is also a *business*, and therefore established a strong advertising department from the very beginning. Seven years later, *Aigak* has built a stable, economically self-sufficient newspaper business which owns its own building, press center and printing press – with plans for launching a local television station as well. This newspaper seems unafraid to engage in investigative journalism (several local officials have been removed following verified reports of corruption from the pages of *Aigak*) and the newspaper's press center has provided equal access for news conferences by government and opposition representatives alike.

The bravest newspapers in reporting on social, economic, and political news, however, remain those papers bankrolled by political parties. Aside from *Epokha*, there are numerous papers throughout the country owned by individuals close to specific political parties. Even the opposition group, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) continues to print numerous papers both for national distribution and for local distribution in select cities. These papers, of course, remain partisan and do not represent the kind of news reporting that we are used to in the United States. Nonetheless, in our focus group meeting with citizens in Almaty, we found that

people often tried to read different partisan newspapers in order to become acquainted with different points of view. One young merchant, for example, said that he did not support the positions of DCK, but he read their newspapers because he said he thought that they reported important information about the political machinations in Kazakhstan that other newspapers did not report.

1.5 Media Advocacy

After a period of relative press freedom in 1993-96, the GOK (including sometimes feuding factions with the governing elite) progressively tightened control mechanisms over aspiring opposition and independent media, including: re-licensing broadcasters to cull out alternative outlets, forced buy-outs, illiberal revisions to laws and regulations, selective tax and other inspections, libel suits, pressure on advertisers to steer ad revenues away from independent media, refusals by state printing presses to publish independent newspapers, blockage of opposition websites, arrests of independent journalists under suspicious circumstances, threats, burglary and/or firebombing of media equipment and offices, and violent assaults on media professionals as well as their families. Already by 2000, President Nazerbaev had earned placement among the “Worst Ten Enemies of the Press” according to a worldwide survey that year by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). The situation against independent media worsened further in 2001 through mid 2003 with GOK actions taken to silence a wide range of opposition and independent media, including the shutdowns of the newspapers: *Nachnem s Ponedelnika*, *Vremya Po*, *Delovoye Obozrenie Respublika*, *SolDat*, and the forced buy-out of *Tan TV*.

The scope of media repression in Kazakhstan might be characterized as authoritarian, but still quite far from approaching totalitarianism. As noted above, some limited space persists for critical journalism and for building partially independent media businesses – so long as (a) any criticism is fact-based and avoids touching the highest, most sensitive levels of political power – specifically the President and his family; and (b) the growth of any prospective independent broadcast business does not too seriously challenge the overwhelming GOK direct and indirect control of the national level television industry. Under increasingly repressive conditions, then, the vigorous legal defense of journalists and of independent media – plus more sustained advocacy for regulations and laws that would contribute to an enabling environment for free media – must all assume paramount importance in any media assistance strategy for Kazakhstan. Internews, *Adil Soz* and the National Association of Broadcasters (NAT/Kazakhstan) are (together and individually) training media professionals and jurists about media-sector laws and (especially *Adil Soz*) monitoring violations in press freedoms. Many media outlets which we visited noted the value of the legal consulting and training assistance. Journalists and editors become more familiar with pertinent laws, enabling them to report in more careful ways to avoid legal problems – and placing themselves in stronger legal positions if legal challenges nevertheless arise. For example, *Aigak* has successfully fended off over forty law suits over the years, mainly due to two staff attorneys, one civil and one criminal (both trained by *Adil Soz*).

Achievements by ongoing media law and advocacy activities are clearly *not* reflected by any general liberalization of press freedoms in Kazakhstan. It would be fair to report, however, that Internews, *Adil Soz*, NAT and other advocates for freer media conditions have: facilitated numerous small legal victories; *slowed the pace and depth of repression*; and, perhaps most importantly, maintained a dialogue with GOK authorities and Kazakh media magnates – contacts which help curb the comprehensiveness of media controls sought by the governing elite, making them at least partially more aware of alternative, liberal democratic perspectives. Internews, *Adil Soz* and NAT (with support from such international media defense organizations as *Article 19*, *Journalists sans Frontieres* and the *Glasnost Defense Foundation*) maintain contact and

participate in media law working groups with key parliamentary deputies, ministry officials, the state-dominated Union of Journalists, and other Kazakh media sector entities, providing ongoing commentary about successive drafts of proposed media laws and amendments. Legislative consultations, while not entirely successful, have nevertheless helped remove some of the most egregious proposed changes to media laws.

The recent efforts undertaken by Adil Soz and Internews through a public campaign against the new draft law “Concerning Mass Media” is a particular vivid example of the abilities and limits of media advocacy in Kazakhstan at present. This draft law demonstrates further backsliding on the rights of independent media in Kazakhstan, especially by giving extreme authority to a new Ministry of Information to interfere in the workings and even staffing of media outlets. While both Internews and Adil Soz initially participated in a parliamentary working group reviewing the law, they publicly pulled out to protest the lack of receptivity of deputies to their concerns. At the same time, along with Kazakhstan Press Club and Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Adil Soz and Internews organized four public hearings on the draft law in Almaty. All major players in the media sector of Kazakhstan were invited to participate in the hearings and voice their concerns about the new legislation, and afterwards the organizers of the hearings sent out a set of recommendations to the working group of the lower house of parliament. On December 25, 2003, Kazakhstan’s lower house passed the draft law “Concerning Mass Media”, but there is still no published version of what is contained in the final version. While the draft law still awaits review by the “rubber stamp” upper house of Kazakhstan’s parliament and signature by the President, it is assumed that the law will be adopted in a form that still represents a significant backsliding in the legal environment for media in the country. Media advocacy activities in this context were effective in making the discussions public and contested, but their ability to significantly change the law’s content or forestall its passage appeared to be extensively limited. It should also be noted that the impact of local media advocacy in Kazakhstan is greatly aided by the support of diplomatic pressure, particularly from the U.S. Embassy and OSCE. The good working relationship between USAID and the U.S. Embassy’s Public Affairs and Political/Economic Office, for example, was critical in facilitating timely and well-informed diplomatic dialogue between the U.S. and Kazakhstan on this draft media law, and pressure continues with the hopes that President Nazerbaev will veto the bill.

1.6 Training

Managers at most visited media outlets reported great difficulties both recruiting and training qualified professional staff. Managers must grapple with personnel deficits in many skill areas (basic journalism, editing, formatting, advertising, and business management), so they typically resort to “picking people from the street” – as one editor put it – then training new recruits on the job. University journalism school curricula remain outdated, focus too much on theory, lack access to new media technologies, and fail to provide practical applied knowledge, meaning that university graduates (if hired by media outlets) need additional training.

The US Embassy seeks to improve higher educational training opportunities through its university partnership program (between the University of Oklahoma and Kazakhstan State University); but embassy officials also frankly acknowledged that the results of this partnership have proven “mixed”. Meanwhile, the Kazakhstan Institute of Management and Economics of the President recently established a new journalism department, which has received some support from the Eurasia Foundation.

Most television professionals with whom we spoke were very thankful to Internews for their training assistance, and most newspaper professionals had similar praise for the training of ICFJ.

At the same time, they noted that there remained a longer-term issue regarding training since new employees are continually coming on board. In short, it was noted that there is little or no institutionalized and sustainable training in Kazakhstan for journalists. Dariga Nazerbaeva's Khabar had briefly opened a mid-career school for journalists recently, but the project was not sustained.

1.7 Evaluation of Performance of Internews in Kazakhstan

All seven visited stations indicated that Internews training activities helped significantly to raise the professional skills of their journalists, computer/graphics specialists, advertising/marketing staffs, and managers. Older, longer established stations indicated greater training needs for middle-level managers and tax-related consulting for financial managers; while younger, more recently-established stations needed training in all areas. Several stations noted the value of the Internews-provided computerized newsroom system *Fabrika novosti* or "News Factory," but this was only feasible for the stations that had the capital to invest in the computer infrastructure needed for this system.

Internews also supports programming through two hours weekly production of *Aina* ("Mirror") and Open Asia. 15 stations regularly help produce contributed stories and show these programs. Almaty office director, Oleg Katsiev, estimates that *Aina* and "Open Asia" are received in 20 cities with a total population of 5-6 million, and an actual average of 2.5 – 3 million viewers weekly. All participating stations felt that these shows added importantly to their program line-ups and enjoyed large audiences. Several stations noted in particular that "Open Asia" was popular due to the fact that Kazakhstanis no longer have access to substantial news sources from the region. Rather, most Kazakhstan citizens know much more about events in Russia than about the political, economic, and social events in Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan. At least one station manager, Valentina Kulikova of *Telekompaniya Otyrar* in Shimkent, argued vigorously (obviously, if extra funding could be found) for increasing Kazakh-produced cultural programming production, which she believes fills a much needed and underserved niche in Kazakhstan's television airwaves.

Internews' production fund also appeared to be fairly successful, but it was much more appreciated by the smaller regional television stations that still lack the capital to invest in new productions and the production equipment awarded with the production grants

1.8 Bottom Line:

Despite very serious reversals in press freedoms since 1997, the media in Kazakhstan show signs of business development, technical production levels and limited pluralism which – taken together -- likely amount to the least unfavorable conditions in the CAR region for the development of independent, professional media. Only Kyrgyzstan enjoys somewhat greater press freedoms, but basic Kyrgyz economic conditions are poorer. The television advertising market in Kazakhstan grew from approximately \$75 million in 2000 to \$130 million in 2002. Newspaper advertising reached \$30 million in 2002, plus Kazakh readers are better able to pay for higher newsstand/cover prices than readers in neighboring CAR countries. The media advertising market remains tiny compared to developed markets in advanced economies, but enjoys good prospects for fast growth in the context of a growing Kazakh market. In this respect, Kazakhstan is far better positioned for media sector expansion than the weaker neighboring CAR economies.

Outside the business realm, there are numerous areas that need assistance in order to increase the availability and diversity of information flowing to the citizens of Kazakhstan. The media industry is quickly being taken over by special interests, most of which are close to the interests of the present President of the country. Recent media legislation suggests that the state also has little political will to open up the media sector and, to the contrary, appears to intent on controlling it. In this context, it is especially important to work on publicly promoting the concept of media as the “fourth estate” in a democratic society that holds the state, public non-state institutions, and the business sector accountable before citizens. Likewise, it is important to foster public discussion of media monopolization and its affect on the sector’s role as the “fourth estate.”

II. Kyrgyzstan Media

2.1 General Situation:

The Kyrgyz media is fairly diverse in comparison with the rest of Central Asia, and there is also a relatively liberal attitude towards critical reporting. That being said, the sector is plagued with multiple problems. The poor economy of the country makes the financial viability of independent media tenuous. These economic problems are compounded by relentless attempts by government officials and others to bankrupt media outlets critical of the government through libel law suits, which are in turn facilitated by sloppy journalism. Finally, there are very few objective sources of news in the country, as the sector is increasingly taking Kazakhstan's lead in adopting the "partisan press" model popular in much of Europe. Despite these many problems, the diversity of the media in the country does hold promise for a better informed citizenry, even if they are informed by a variety of partisan sources. The largest barrier to establishing such an informed citizenry, however, is ensuring that people throughout Kyrgyzstan have access to the full range of media that is available in the country. These observations are further discussed by media sector below.

2.2 Television:

As is the case in all of the Central Asian countries, the state in Kyrgyzstan has at least proxy control of most of the television in the capital and of most of the television stations that broadcast in multiple locations. As in Kazakhstan, the President's family in Kyrgyzstan has taken control of the majority of "commercial" television stations in the capital city. While none of these stations have either been based on a former state television station or have branched out into the entire country yet as has been the case with Dariga Nazerbaeva's "Khabar" station in Kazakhstan, they appear to be growing in strength. In the capital of Bishkek, there are five licensed television stations. The state-owned KTR has the largest breadth of these stations and broadcasts virtually everywhere in the country. In fact, it was recently announced that Russia's GazProm oil and gas company will invest money in the station to assist it to reach all regions of the country. There are two major stations owned by President Akaev's son-in-law, Adil Toigonbaev, KOORT and "Independent Bishkek Television" (NBT), the latter which was formerly owned by Akaev's son Aidar. KOORT in particular is planning to expand its broadcasting to include re-transmission on various small regional stations, a sign that it may have ambitions similar to those of Dariga Nazerbaeva's "Khabar." The fourth station, "Pyramida," has long been the strongest independent television station in Central Asia and has received substantial assistance from USAID programs. It broadcasts its signal in the city of Osh in addition to Bishkek, and it re-broadcasts on several small regional stations. Recently, however, the station has become more conservative, having edited out sections of Internews' news exchange before broadcasting it and having become more careful in its production of the USAID-funded political talk show it airs in conjunction with the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Rumors suggest that these developments are related to a change in the station's editorial staff. Recently, the editor was removed, and the new one is a good friend of Meyram Akaeva, the President's wife. This change in staffing and its resulting impact on program content may suggest that the station's ownership could also be changing hands or at least is becoming more beholden to people close to the President. The last licensed station, VOSST, is not broadcasting at this time, but it is rumored to have been bought by a consortium of people in the oil and gas business including both a Russian company and a company owned again by Adil Toigonbaev, the son-in law of President Akaev. It is also rumored that VOSST will be a base for a nationwide network of stations. Thus, in effect, all of Bishkek's stations are controlled to differing

degrees by the President's family, and most of them have ambitions of broadcasting nation-wide. Furthermore, Russian interests in the media outlets controlled by the President's family are growing.

Other than making for interesting political intrigue, the fact that all of these television stations may be within the control of the President's family has obvious implications for the type of information that the stations provide viewers. KTR, which broadcasts primarily in Kyrgyz, provides the old Soviet style of news, accenting the achievements of the state in industry and agriculture and highlighting the actions of the President. NBT and KOORT keep a demeanor of objectivity, but they are rarely critical of government policies and are often critical of the political opposition. While "Pyramida" keeps an image as a more hard-hitting news and information station, its news in particular has recently become increasingly pro-governmental.

While television in Bishkek may set the tone for the rest of the country, there are opportunities for small local independent television stations to exist in other regions of the country. We visited four regional independent television stations during our assessment: Anten-TV and EM-TV in Karakol, Osh-TV in Osh, and TV-Mezon in Jalalabad. While the quality of each varied, they all had potential to be a local counter-balance to the more tightly controlled television news sources coming out of Bishkek.

The two television stations in Karakol were the best of the four. Anten-TV was recently founded by several workers from EM-TV who had left for creative reasons. As is the case with most independent television stations in the region, the majority of their programs are re-transmitted from a Russian network (in this case, TNT). Despite being short-staffed, they had also succeeded in establishing daily news, a weekly talk show on local political, social, and economic issues, and a morning show that combines news with human interest and variety programming. The most impressive aspect of Anten-TV was the passion of its journalists, who truly embodied the spirit of the "fourth estate." They were quite good at seeking out interesting and relevant stories and framing them in an objective yet critical manner. Furthermore, despite the grave economic difficulties in Kyrgyzstan, the management of Anten-TV appeared to have a good sense for attracting advertisement and had even gotten a local businessman to buy into the ownership of the station. "EM-TV" was also very impressive. While its journalism seemed to suffer from the loss of several staff members to Anten-TV, it appeared to still be a thriving station that sought to cover local news critically and thoroughly. In fact, the Director of "EM-TV" even noted that he felt the competition with his former colleagues at Anten-TV was increasing the quality of his station's programming. "EM-TV" was also very sophisticated in its marketing and its outreach to advertisers. Along the main tourist road to Issyk Kul, for example, EM-TV advertises on numerous old abandoned structures and rocks, alerting incoming tourists of their existence. In many respects, the situation in Karakol with independent television is a model for which to strive. There are two growing stations, both of which provide objective yet critical alternatives to official news sources. The competition between the two stations has only served to increase the capacity and quality of both stations, a phenomenon that both stations acknowledge. In fact, the success of both stations has also driven each to explore their own means of expanding their broadcasting to the entire Issyk Kul Oblast. Given the significant influx of tourists from both Bishkek and Kazakhstan to Issyk Kul during the summer months, both stations could potentially realize these plans and finance them through advertising targeting both Kyrgyz and Kazakh citizens with expendable capital.

While not as exciting as what we found in Karakol, Osh-TV was also impressive. Broadcasting in a mixture of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian languages, Osh-TV produces a significant amount of its own programming. In speaking with production staff, it appeared that the motivation for these productions came from a system of piecemeal payment to employees. Employees are paid

per their production output, thus providing an incentive to produce more. Much of their locally-produced programming, however, is of an entertainment nature. Nonetheless, Osh-TV does provide fairly independent news reporting and has produced some talk shows. The final station we visited, TV-Mezon in Jalalabad was very weak. The staff of the station showed us some programming on the Ferghana Valley that they had produced with the help of a grant from Eurasia Foundation, but they said at present they had suspended news programming. In effect, the station mostly just rebroadcasts the Russian station TNT. This being said, the channel had a very powerful transmitter and could potentially reach a large market. One possible reason that the station is now essentially inactive could be that it is owned by somebody who may want to activate it later during the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections.

In terms of the business side of television in Kyrgyzstan, independent stations have grave difficulties. The relatively poor economic situation in the country makes the advertising market very small. Furthermore, many small businesses either do not see the advantage of advertising or feel that it will only make their business more visible to predatory tax authorities. Finally, the President's son in law, Adil Toigonbaev, who has the largest media holding in the country, also owns the largest and most influential advertising agency in the country and is able to monopolize advertising for his own stations. We were even told a rumor that merchants bringing goods from Kazakhstan are pressured at the customs inspection to sign an advertising deal with Adil's company before being allowed to bring their goods into the country for sale. This situation leaves most local independent television stations short-staffed and unable to produce a significant amount of their own programming. This being said, several of the independent stations that we visited did have a strategy for advertising that was at least partially successful. It was noted that most stations had been trained in marketing strategies, but they did not have access to any formal ratings system that could be used to formulate a truly successful strategy. Also, it should be noted that the specifics of the Kyrgyz economy, that could be characterized as a mixture of *capitalism* and state-based *cleptocracy*, had created a situation where most independent stations found that their best revenue sources come from political figures during election periods. Furthermore, it appeared that these revenue sources did not only entail legitimate "political advertisements," but also a more insidious process of buying political interest. If this is a widespread phenomenon, it greatly detracts from the reliability of television news, particularly during an election cycle.

In general, therefore, the situation for independent television in Kyrgyzstan is mixed. The state-owned station KTR is the only station to reach the majority of the country's citizens, the strongest "commercial" stations in the country are either owned or highly-influenced by people in the President's immediate family. While local independent television stations are able to broadcast fairly openly, they must employ self-censorship on the most controversial subjects (such as last year's referendum), are hurting financially, and are mostly allocated 10 meter frequencies which cannot be viewed on older Soviet television sets without a special antenna. Despite these difficulties, there are some bright spots in Kyrgyzstan's independent television sector. Pyramida, while apparently increasingly beholden to the "powers that be," still is a strong partner with USAID implementers on a variety of hard-hitting programs that reach a large audience in both the north and south of the country. Furthermore, the healthy and constructive competition between local independent television stations in Karakol is a model of local media development to strive for throughout the region.

2.3 Radio:

There are only a few information-based independent radio stations in Kyrgyzstan, but it is potentially a fertile area to explore. We only visited one radio station in the country, but we

were impressed with the station's reach and its programming. This station, which is called "Almaz-Yug," was primarily staffed by youth and mostly interested in its music programming. Nonetheless, it was also very willing to produce informational programming through various grant programs (it already is a contributing partner of the Internews radio news exchange and had a grant from the Eurasia Foundation for a radio talk show). While the station appeared skeptical about the prospects of attracting advertising revenue for informational programming, this could be an opportunity to further explore. Although we were not able to see any other stations, most of which are in smaller cities that we could not visit, there are apparently at least four other stations similar to "Almaz-Yug" throughout the country. Recently, through the USAID-funded Internews program, these five stations have formed an association, which is similar to a network. They are all working on the Internews radio news exchange pilot program, and other informational exchanges could be a possibility in the future.

2.4 Newspapers:

There is a wide diversity of newspapers in Kyrgyzstan that range in political allegiances from pro-governmental to opposition and in focus from criminal investigative reporting to economic and business news. The power of newspapers to influence public opinion is apparent in the constant legal battles that transpire between newspapers critical of the government and the government officials themselves. Most newspapers in the country, however, are not financially sustainable. When Alexander Kim, a savvy journalist and manager, took over the former state-owned newspaper "Verchernyi Bishkek" and made it politically critical as well as finally profitable through classified advertisements, he was gradually pushed out and forced to sell the paper to Adil Toigonbaev, the President's son-in-law. Subsequently, Kim started a new paper focused on political news, "Moya Stolitsa," which has stayed afloat almost exclusively on grants from international donors. One newspaper that focuses on criminal investigative reporting, "Delo No.," has been financially successful through large sales, but avoids political issues in order to guard against possible negative repercussions. Smaller newspapers, such as the business and politics weekly "Limon" and the investigative paper "Tribuna" appear to rely heavily on grants to operate. The same could be said of the bi-lingual "Ferghana" newspaper, which publishes hard hitting news in both Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages in the south of the country. While most newspapers in Kyrgyzstan do not appear to practice significant self-censorship, they are under constant threat of libel suits that could bankrupt their operations. This past year, "Moya Stolitsa" declared bankruptcy after losing a string of law suits. Since the newspaper's primary property had been given as a grant from the U.S. Embassy's Democracy Commission, however, the U.S. Embassy was able to regain custody of the equipment and re-grant it to "Moya Stolitsa Novosti," which Kim opened shortly after having declared bankruptcy at "Moya Stolitsa."

If there is a wide variety of newspapers in Kyrgyzstan, most of them only reach a readership in Bishkek where they are based. The only significant independent and critical newspaper outside of Bishkek appears to be "Ferghana," which targets readership in the south of the country. The primary reason that Bishkek-based newspapers do not reach a larger readership is that no independent distribution system exists. This is something that should be explored by USAID and the USG, perhaps in connection with the independent printing press project funded by the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). At present, the cost of bringing newspapers to other regions of Kyrgyzstan increases the street price of the newspapers beyond a level which is affordable to the average citizen outside Bishkek. At a kiosk in Jalalabad, for example, "Moya Stolitsa Novosti" now costs approximately 50 cents a copy, a significant expense in Kyrgyzstan's economy, especially outside of Bishkek. A demand for newspapers, however, appears to exist outside Bishkek. In our focus group in Bishkek, for

example, several people said that they gathered multiple copies of various newspapers and would bring them to relatives outside the capital when visiting other regions. Given this demand, it is expected that people outside Bishkek will buy newspapers from the capital if they are available at an affordable price locally. Compounding this problem is the fact that most newspapers are content with relying on newspaper sales to pay for operation costs. In the United States, for example, advertising pays most or all operation costs for newspapers, and the sale price of the paper itself only pays for distribution and perhaps printing. If more papers had strong advertising strategies, this could also translate into cheaper street prices since there would be an added incentive to increase distribution and a revenue source to bring down the price.

Another issue facing the newspaper industry in Kyrgyzstan is the quality of reporting. Journalists are often sloppy in securing reliable sources and are ardently partisan in their political views. This has allowed government officials to more easily use legal suits to attack those papers with which they do not agree. Interestingly, most citizens with whom we spoke in focus groups in Bishkek and Osh did not fully trust newspapers or the media as a whole. They did, however, suggest that they often read both opposition and pro-presidential newspapers in order to determine what truth lies between these extremes. While there have been numerous efforts on the part of different donors to address the problems of “partisan reporting” in Kyrgyzstan through trainings in objective reporting methodologies, most journalists have not been very receptive to such efforts.

2.5 Media Advocacy:

There are actually many organizations in Kyrgyzstan that assist in media advocacy. The USAID-funded Freedom House human rights defenders program has helped to rally human rights organizations in the country to increasingly address issues related to freedom of the press over the last year. In addition, the Association “Journalists” is funded under a regional USAID grant to conduct monitoring on abuses of journalists’ rights and freedom of the press. Over the last year, a new broadcasters association has also formed in the country and could potentially be an important force in advocating on behalf of media outlets and freedom of the press as a whole. In the south of the country, the Osh and Jalalabad Media Resource Centers also play an important advocacy role as well as provide various resources to media professionals. In addition to these efforts, the local branch of the British NGO “Institute for War and Peace Reporting” (IWPR) is a strong advocate for journalists and media rights. Finally, given the high profile of violations of the freedom of the press, other advocacy NGOs that support the development of democracy in Kyrgyzstan more generally often help undertake advocacy campaigns in support of the media.

Over the past two years, the efforts of these various groups have greatly increased the attention paid to issues of media rights and freedom of speech. Due to advocacy efforts inside the country, for example, there has been increasing international attention paid to the situation of journalists in Kyrgyzstan. In turn, the Government of Kyrgyzstan (GOKG) hired a former Soros Foundation employee to become the Presidential Press Secretary likely to better engage international donors and local NGOs on this issue. Also, it is worth mentioning that these efforts have had some concrete successes in the last two years as well. In 2002, for example, the Government of Kyrgyzstan repealed a presidential decree calling for state registration and control of all printing means including photocopy machines due to a concerted advocacy effort undertaken by local NGOs and the international community. Likewise, the constant international attention paid to libel suits against Kyrgyz journalists in recent years recently prompted the government to consider new legislation “decriminalizing” libel and requiring those who bring such suits against others to pay a 5% fee of their suit before bring a case to trial. This

legislation, however, is still pending, and it cannot yet be considered a complete advocacy success.

2.6 Training:

While there are numerous opportunities for training available to journalists and media professionals in Kyrgyzstan, very little of this training is institutionalized locally and almost all of it is provided with foreign donor support. Local journalists and media professionals felt that local journalism schools were too theoretical and, thus, unable to truly prepare incoming employees. In the area of television, the USAID-funded Internews project remains the only major provider of technical training, but it has only just begun to institutionalize its training by cultivating a local cadre of trainers. In the area of newspaper journalism, there are multiple training providers in the donor community, but most of them provide only one-time trainings on discrete issues. The only exceptions to this are Internews' partner, the "International Center for Journalists" (ICFJ), and the Swiss-funded Cimera organization. These two programs provide at least a more or less comprehensive training package to targeted newspaper professionals. Furthermore, there is a general lack of training on newspaper marketing and advertising, which contributes to the lack of financial sustainability among most print media.

Despite the problems of journalism and media training's ephemeral and unsustainable nature, there is a demand for more training. The directors of media outlets, in particular, felt that they constantly needed more training to ensure that their staff had the capacity to do their job. Television stations noted that without the assistance of Internews in continually providing training in new technologies and methods, their stations would be far less developed and unprofessional.

2.7 Evaluation of the Performance of Internews in Kyrgyzstan:

The Internews program over the past two years has done a fairly good job of adapting to a very complex media environment. Internews' training program continues to be a central part of its project and without a doubt fills an important need, especially among television journalists and professionals. The only serious drawback in this aspect of Internews' work is that it still lacks any concrete mechanism for creating sustainable training provision in the country. Only recently has Internews begun to train local trainers with this in mind. Internews' new nominal print media training program, which is implemented by ICFJ, is a worthwhile addition to the project, but it is too limited in its scope given the large newspaper market in Kyrgyzstan. Internews, however, has been increasingly responsive to radio stations' needs, especially through their radio news exchange program that they have started with supplemental funding from USAID.

In the past two years, Internews' program has also exhibited a welcomed more proactive approach in the areas of production support, media advocacy, and media networking. The production grant fund implemented by Internews has been fairly successful in encouraging and facilitating the expansion of locally-produced informational programming. A grant to the Karakol station Anten-TV, for example, helped that station generate a daily news program that it will likely sustain long after the grant has ended. The grant fund's primary shortcoming is that it has not encouraged media outlets enough either to push the envelope in the new programs they are producing or to provide concrete plans for how grant-funded programming will be sustained after the grant has expired. While some stations, such as Anten-TV, have used production fund grants to add sustained programming to their broadcasting schedule, many grants have been for more short-term projects. Furthermore, since the focus of this program has been on "social issues," many of the projects funded have not been as hard-hitting as they could be in

Kyrgyzstan's relatively liberal atmosphere. For this reason, any future media project in CAR should attempt to solicit more targeted programming for funding to ensure that this programming is really opening up the informational space in the country and, if possible, has a sustained effect on this space. Internews' news exchanges ("Door" and "Open Asia"), however, do seem to be improving in this regard. The examples of these programs which we viewed did push the envelope on critical issues and did tend to help open up the informational space in the country. The primary shortcoming of this aspect of Internews' work is that it does not do enough to truly encourage local media outlets to adopt a more hard-hitting approach to their own news reporting. In the area of media advocacy, Internews has helped to facilitate and support a variety of media associations among its partners. These include a new broadcast media association, a radio association (which is more akin to a network), and an advertising association. Finally, Internews has done a particularly good job of instituting means for media networking. Over the past year, for example, they have gathered media professionals for discussions of Internews' program as well as for a well-publicized nation-wide media conference that was accompanied by an awards program focused on all media sectors.

In general, we found that Internews had done a very good job in fulfilling the work outlined in their present agreement with USAID and, in some cases, had even seized opportunities that are not envisioned in this agreement. That being said, we also felt that the complexities of independent media in Kyrgyzstan may require some changes in focus for a follow-on media program. First, it is very important that any USAID-funded media program take on an increased role in facilitating public discussions about the role of media in society. Secondly, the newspaper market in Kyrgyzstan requires more assistance than can be given under Internews' present agreement with USAID. More work also needs to be done in the area of promoting and producing programming that is explicitly focused on political issues and political discussions, and future USAID assistance must also address the need to institutionalize training locally in the country.

2.8 Bottom Line:

Independent media in Kyrgyzstan may already be an irreversible part of society, and people will likely continue to resist attempts to destroy it entirely. That being said, the reach of independent media is still greatly restricted by both political and economic factors. Politically, it is clear that there are continued attempts by powerful people to keep independent media controlled and accessible to as few people as possible. Economically, it is difficult for any people outside the inner circle of the President and his family to finance nation-wide independent media access. Furthermore, local independent media outside Bishkek and Osh is obviously hindered in its development by the limits of the local economy and its very small advertising market. In this context, it is important to work with independent media to prevent any further deterioration of the situation and to get public support for this endeavor.

III. Tajikistan Media

3.1 General Situation:

Independent (non-state) media continue a process of cautious emergence from the tragic civil war years (1992-97), when 50,000 -150,000 persons were killed (including at least 70 journalists as the result of their professional work), press freedoms disappeared, and the economy largely collapsed. Although reforms and recovery have proceeded slowly, the media professionals we met indicated a gradual broadening of scope for permissible journalism – as well as modestly increasing media business prospects. The GDP grew 10.2% in 2001, 8.3% in 2002, and a projected 6% in 2003, providing opportunities for private media to increase earnings from copy sales and advertising. Tendencies toward slight liberalization in press freedoms and economic growth, however, should not cloud awareness that the media in Tajikistan are starting from an extremely low level. The grim economic situation in Tajikistan, for example, made local television stations and other media in the country the least sustainable of those we examined. Also, despite some international reports to the contrary, freedom of speech and media rights in Tajikistan are far less developed than in either Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan.

3.2 Television:

There is no independent television available in Tajikistan's capital of Dushanbe. While the Asia Plus media holding (see radio and newspaper sections below) has recently tried to obtain a license to open an independent television station in Dushanbe, it was flatly refused by the state's licensing committee. As a result, Dushanbe residents presently only receive the Tajik State TV channel, a station owned by the city government, and Russian state television. Besides these options, many residents who can afford to do so purchase either cable television or a satellite dish and receiver, both of which give them access to numerous stations from Russia. Recently, the Government of Tajikistan (GOTJ) also announced its intentions to create a second state television station. Given events elsewhere in the region, one wonders whether this plan for a second state TV station is also being supported by Russia. Of the two local stations presently broadcasting in Dushanbe, the city government's station, *Poitakht TV*, is more professional. The state TV station's news reporting more closely resembles the state television stations of the Soviet period, providing information on the achievements of the state in agriculture and industry and covering the activities of the President. While *Poitakht* is nominally better, it still provides a solidly pro-government stance in virtually all news reporting.

If the situation for television news in Dushanbe is grim at best, there are some opportunities for the development of independent television outside the capital city. The most vibrant television market in this respect is in the north of the country in the area of Khujand. While there are several small independent television stations scattered throughout northern Tajikistan, two stand out as having the most promise. The first is the largest and longest-established private television station in Tajikistan—SM-1. SM-1 was founded in April, 1997 and has a broadcast license that was recently renewed through April, 2005. SM-1 airs 13 hours of programming daily, of which 6 hours is self-produced (an impressive volume of self-produced programs for a local station of this size). A 15-20 minute newscast "Khabar" airs three times daily weekdays at 8:00, 19:00, and 21:00. SM-1 produces a quite wide variety of local public affairs programs, including a show on local history and culture (My City), a weekly 20-25 minute review of the Tajik press (Press Review), a historical show about Tajikistan (Civilization), a two-hour morning show, and at least two talk shows. We observed recorded fragments from a recent talk show titled *Afkor*, funded by National Endowment for Democracy (NED) grantee National Democratic Institute (NDI), which quite effectively addressed difficult inter-ethnic issues with a mix of seasoned

discussion interspersed with pertinent film clips. (While the *Afkor* episode on ethnic relations was well done, the show's moderator showed room for improvement if she could take special training on the art of talk show hosting).

Director Akram Uronov, believes that SM-1 enjoys substantial, if not complete, professional autonomy to cover most local issues – and that the station's audience knows that SM-1 is not afraid to call attention to local social-economic problems. Discussion programs typically include representatives and perspectives from up to six political parties. A talk show about the problem of forcible military conscription in October, 2002, however, did result (ironically enough) in the forced conscription of two of the station's journalists several days after the airing of that program. So very real limits exist as to how deeply or critically journalists can probe without getting into trouble (license denials, tax inspections, or even forced military conscriptions).

A smaller, newer television station operating in the Khujand suburb of Chkalov is TK *Jahonoro*. The station director, Mahmudjon Dodoboyev, earlier worked in SM-1, but left due to disagreements with the SM-1 director. Yet the relationship between SM-1 and *Jahonoro* appears cordial, so the establishment of the new *Jahonoro* station may result in a mutually positive rivalry among two private TV companies (similar to the creatively friendly competition by two stations observed in Karakol, Kyrgyzstan) – and also demonstrates that new entries are possible in Khujand. *Jahonoro* started broadcasting four hours daily in July, 2003, with a low-power transmitter covering Chkalov, plus maybe half of Khujand. Local news lasts ten minutes daily, and a 45 minute weekly talk show also addresses local issues.

Outside of the north, we visited one television station in the city of Tursunzoda, about a one-hour drive to the east of Dushanbe near the Uzbekistan border. Operating since 1993, this station, TV *Ragar*, transmits six hours daily, including twenty minutes of news each weekday (twice weekly in both Russian and Tajik; once weekly in Uzbek). Sample daily newscasts looked good, including in-depth coverage of such local problems as city's aging bus fleet, problems with building upkeep and repairs, etc. Criticism was constructive, fact-based, and balanced with lighter, slice-of-life human interest stories. *Ragar* also produces a weekly Sunday local news wrap-up, called *Itogi Nedeli*, and a talk show called "Your Voice" to discuss local problematic issues.

Finally, it is worth mentioning a formerly USAID-funded program in Dushanbe that sought to support an independent television studio serving independent stations throughout the country. This program, implemented through Asia-Plus' media holding, produced a weekly news program from the country's capital that was aimed at providing local independent stations with an independent and alternative national news service. A combination of political pressure and an insufficient market for such a service, however, forced the closure of this program, and the equipment given to Asia Plus is awaiting use again for news programming if Asia Plus ever succeeds in registering an independent TV station.

All three of these stations, however, could be deemed fledgling. They had poor access to technology and ran on a shoe-string budget. Several issues contributed to the tenuous status of such local independent television stations. While the most obvious and most difficult to remedy is the poor state of the Tajik economy, the antiquated and restrictive nature of Tajikistan's media law and its implementation appear to be equally debilitating. Tajik law prohibits rebroadcast of foreign stations (unlike elsewhere in the region), and the registration process is extremely restrictive and apparently largely controlled by the vested interest of Tajik state TV. Finally, as is true throughout the region, the actual ability of local independent television to provide objective and critical reporting relies largely on the tenuous good graces of local officials.

3.3 Radio:

The relatively lower costs and easier accessibility of radio to ordinary citizens make this medium especially attractive for conditions in Tajikistan. Site visits to the country's three largest commercial radio stations helped identify the opportunities as well as the technical assistance needs for independent (privately-owned) radio development in larger cities such as Khujand and Dushanbe. Other discussions (particularly with Internews) suggested *community radio* as a better model for small towns and poorer, rural areas.

In March, 2001, *Radio Tiroz* in Khujand was the first independent FM station to go on the air in post-civil war Tajikistan. The station's 350 watt signal covers Khujand and surrounding areas with a total population of up to 1.3 million people. *Tiroz* broadcasts 16 hours daily, with five minute newscasts each hour. 60% of news stories are local, covered by *Tiroz* reporters; and the remaining 40% of news cover international affairs -- drawing mainly from Internet-based sources of information. The station's general director says that *Tiroz* targets younger listeners, while older audiences remain more loyal to state radio fares. His staff attended Internews seminars (which were deemed useful) and the station also runs an Internews-supported call-in talk show called "Territory of Law", which informs listeners about legal issues and invites phoned-in questions.

Radio Asia Plus was the first private radio station to open in Dushanbe, but only in 2002 after a protracted but ultimately successful four year struggle to obtain a license. The station offers frequent newscasts, call-in public affairs talk shows, and an orientation toward younger audiences. A newer commercial station, *Vatan* -- launched in Dushanbe in May, 2003, by a young, energetic entrepreneur (Daler Amonov) with local capital -- appears off to a strong start. Educated as an economist, Amonov demonstrates noteworthy business savvy. He targeted an older, more mature niche of the market (compared to Asia Plus) including especially business persons -- recognizing that many important advertisers (such as cell phone companies) seek this audience profile. *Vatan* airs three-five minutes of news every half hour (alternating between Russian and Tajik language versions, each version with different stories), plus special in-depth reports with up to eight minutes of analysis about a selected issue, and a new 30 minute end of the week news journal. Amonov says advertising revenues are good, allowing *Vatan* within its first six months of operation to repay its \$70,000 start-up loan for equipment.

3.4 Newspapers:

The evaluation team visited only one newspaper, *Asia Plus*, but we also received good overview data about the Tajik (especially the Dushanbe) newspaper sector from the local polling research organization *Zerkalo*.

The newspaper *Asia Plus* has grown from a circulation of 2,000 in 1998 to 6-7,000 currently. Two main revenue sources, copy sales and advertising, are divided about 50-50 as percentages of overall earnings. Notably, half of all advertising sales (and one-fourth of all revenues) come from the placement of PSAs and other announcements by foreign donors.

Zerkalo data paints an interesting picture of reader preferences and profitability strategies by the three major private publishers in Tajikistan. The Asia Plus "group" (newspaper, radio, and news agency) tends to mix popular light materials with more serious public affairs contents to attract a broader range of readers (or listeners in the case of radio). By contrast, the publishing group of

Akbarali Sattorov offers one serious “social-political” newspaper (*Vechernyi Dushanbe*, probably at a loss) and more than recoups these losses through sales of popular tabloids such as *Digest Press*, *Avitsenna*, *Aladdin* and Tajikistan’s most popular tabloid, *Charkhi Gardun* (Garden of Fortune). And, similarly, the publishing group of Sharif Hamdamov draws profits from the popular women’s paper *Oila* (“Family”) and *Crime-Info* to support the unprofitable socio-political paper *Tozikiston*.

Recently, three more critical newspapers have also begun publishing in Dushanbe and have gained significantly in popularity. These papers are *Ruzi Nav*, *Nerui Sukhan*, and *Tojikistion*. While these papers have grown in popularity among Dushanbe readers, the government has been less tolerant of their hard-hitting approach to the news. During this year, the first two of these papers were issued a *warning* from the government for “insulting the head of state and printing unfounded criticism of government officials.” Likewise, recent *Ruzi Nav* (or “New Day”) was prevented from printing an issue of its newspaper on the state printing press due to the issue’s inclusion of an article critical of the government. The newspaper, however, has found an alternative undisclosed printing house to publish the paper and continues to exist. While such critical alternative news sources have begun to appear in Dushanbe, they are very difficult to obtain outside the capital, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan, due to poor distribution systems.

Regarding the scope for permissible press freedom in Tajikistan, *Asia Plus* editor Marat Mamadshoev said his and other non-state newspapers can include constructive, careful criticism – but most avoid materials that might be deemed as too critical by government officials. Access to information remains very limited, since many government officials remain fearful of journalists and lack savvy or experience how to deal with the concept of a free press. And, obviously, the state-owned press – constituting about one-third of all newspaper titles in Dushanbe, plus virtually all oblast-level newspapers – tends to tote the government’s policy line. Nonetheless, as is the case both in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as well, there is much more breadth of political ideas and critical reporting in newspapers than on television or radio.

3.5 Media Advocacy:

An enabling legal environment for freer media represents a key element – vitally needed by emerging independent media in Tajikistan -- if their trend toward professional and business development is to be promulgated and, preferably, accelerated. In addition to Internews/Tajikistan, at least three other media-sector NGOs have undertaken support and advocacy functions on behalf of non-state media: IWPR (which we did not visit), the National Association of Independent Mass Media in Tajikistan (NANSMIT) in Dushanbe, and the NGO “Fourth Power” in Khujand.

NANSMIT was founded in 1999 and over time has gained growing respect from legislators and government officials – overcoming considerable initial GOTJ reluctance to recognize the interests of the non-state media sector. NANSMIT directly represents 35 member media outlets, but will assist or defend non-member media organizations and journalists when needed. In 2003, NANSMIT began to develop a network of media rights monitoring with *Adil Soz*: its first monitoring report in October reported on seven violations of press freedoms, mainly in the area of blocked access to information.

NANSMIT has actively engaged in legislative advising and advocacy for improved media laws and regulations. Since mid 2002, NANSMIT has organized successive conferences, advising and commenting on successive drafts of a proposed new law on radio-television broadcasting and, in particular, pushing for: (a) broadened representation on the licensing commission

[including not just members of the State Committee on Radio and Television Broadcasting, but also representatives from civil society and non-state media]; (b) simplification of licensing procedures; (c) allowance for greater use of foreign-produced program materials; and many other issues. With regard to economic conditions for privately-owned media, NANSMIT effectively lobbied for an advertising law that helped media increase their ad revenues, therefore increasing their prospects for economic viability. Currently, NANSMIT is also pushing for eased VAT taxes on media to further assist the financial condition of the sector.

In Khujand, the press center “Fourth Power” (with support from non-USAID sources) provides a broad array of services for media outlets throughout northern Tajikistan, ranging from training, Internet access, press conferences, and provision of five minute weekly video news reports to raion-level TV stations. Interestingly, “Fourth Power” seems to be playing a constructive bridging role between the independent media and government officials in Northern Tajikistan, through training of press secretaries and through its press conference activities. According to press center “Fourth Power” director, Parvona Firuz, many local officials as they gained experience became more comfortable with press conferences and handling relations with more independent journalists.

Despite the existence of these organizations, there is a dire need for media advocacy in Tajikistan. As noted above in the section on television, the media legislation in Tajikistan is very restrictive and antiquated. Furthermore, its implementation is very poor and often undertaken at the whims of local officials or even national-level bureaucrats. In this context, there is serious need for more emphasis on media advocacy in the country.

3.6 Training:

Owing to the emigration of many media professionals, plus a protracted hiatus for much educational activity during the civil war, training needs among the Tajik media are perhaps the most keenly felt among the four Central Asian countries visited. The assessment team did not examine any university programs, but heard that university graduates suffer from the same shortcomings as faced elsewhere in Central Asia: students receive general theoretical background, but lack technical or practical knowledge they can apply in day-to-day journalism or in media business operations.

Media outlets rely on a sometimes scattered array of short-term training opportunities provided mainly by foreign donors, including Internews and ICFJ (see next section), Cimera (which will give intensive newspaper consulting to *Asia Plus* during the coming year) and small-scale training opportunities by Deutsche Welle, and IWPR. The NGO “Fourth Power” in Khujand and the Asia Plus “School of the 21st Century in Dushanbe serve as two fixed sites for short-term media training (and other) media-related activities.

3.7 Evaluation of the Performance of Internews and ICFJ in Tajikistan:

Site visits to two television stations in Khujand, TV *Ragar* in Tursunzoda, and the Asia-Plus video studio in Dushanbe provided evidence that Internews support for independent television in Tajikistan has proven helpful – and that possible further work in the areas of TV program production and network development should be explored. Station managers appreciated the scope of training subjects available to their staff (including broadcast journalism, production, advertising, and some business management) and reported that their best cadres typically gained their professional knowledge from Internews training activities.

Similarly, the directors at all three visited radio stations very highly valued the impact of Internews training on the professional level of their journalists, advertising, and business staff. The principal complaint of broadcast managers was their wish for increased training in the areas of advertising and business development.

Less training of Tajik newspaper professionals has taken place to date, but *Asia Plus* editors did note the usefulness of the two seminars by ICFJ's George Krinsky, who helped the newspaper staff better understand how to strive for profitability and to develop their paper as a business.

3.8 Bottom Line:

The situation for independent media in Tajikistan is tenuous at best. Independent media outlets are under political and economic pressure, and they are restricted by poor legislation and registration requirements. In this context, it is important to bolster advocacy activities and to assist truly independent media outlets with creative plans for remaining profitable or at least self-sustainable. Advocacy is particularly vital to getting the Government of Tajikistan to change its legislation and registration practices governing media outlets. Furthermore, given the poor economic conditions and mountainous terrain of Tajikistan, more focus should be given to independent radio development, especially outside Dushanbe.

IV. Uzbekistan Media

4.1 General Situation:

The Uzbek government has kept a close hold on media of all kinds since the fall of the Soviet Union. Until last year, the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) still had an official office of censorship in the Agency for Press and Information. While the censor was abolished last year, a “post-censorship” policy continues through the same agency’s office of monitoring. In the last year, there have been several instances where media outlets and journalists have been subject to harassment and/or legal proceedings. The editor of the newspaper “Mahiyat” was replaced by a pro-presidential editor after the paper published a poem that had veiled criticism of the President. Furthermore, a young journalist who was also active in human rights was arrested for homosexuality and pedophilia under suspect circumstances. In this context of harassment, the degree of self-censorship in the country is extreme. There are, however, also some significant opportunities in the media sector at the moment, especially given the high degree of engagement that the USG enjoys with the GOU. USAID programs must take advantage of these opportunities to push the envelope as much as possible. To highlight the more specific situation, difficulties and opportunities included, we examine each sector of Uzbek media separately below.

4.2 Television:

At present, the GOU has four-state owned television stations. These stations vary in quality, but they generally are supportive of governmental policies and highlight the positive work of the President. All of these stations broadcast throughout the country on 1 meter frequencies, allowing them to reach practically all Uzbek citizens with televisions. One of these stations also re-broadcasts the Russian state channel ORT’s news program “Vremya.” Since it controls the re-broadcast, however, it can also edit out any content that is objectionable to state authorities. Focus groups with citizens suggested that educated and urban citizens of Uzbekistan are highly dissatisfied with their choices for television viewing. Furthermore, those who desire better access to news tend to get it either from opposition websites run from abroad or from cable television, which is available in some areas of the country. Since the government also closely monitors cable television, however, it is also possible to block programming from Russian channels on the cable network when that programming might be critical of Uzbekistan. In addition, there is a minority of citizens that have their own satellite dishes, which give them access to Russian programming that cannot be filtered by the Uzbek government. In general, however, most citizens have very little access to alternative news.

Despite this control of nation-wide broadcasting, there are opportunities for small local independent television stations to exist in the country. The quality of these stations and their ability to provide independent reporting, however, depends upon both the capacity of the stations and the political openness of the local government. During the assessment, we visited five local independent television stations: Orbita TV in Angren, Mullokat TV in Kokand, Margilon TV in Margilon, Bakhtiyor TV in Jizzak, and S-TV in Samarkand. These stations represented a wide spectrum of the possibilities in local television in Uzbekistan. The best stations, Orbita in Angren and Bakhtiyor in Jizzak, were able to do investigative reporting and engage in talk shows with governmental officials. In both cases, their abilities to push the envelope on informational programming were obviously related to the talents of the directors and the relative openness of the local government in both of these cities. In both cases, we witnessed that a constructive relationship had developed between the television station and local authorities. Mullokat TV and Margilon TV, however, were not as impressive. Mullokat appeared to be very careful in its

reporting and more concerned with being responsive to donors on grant projects than to its community of viewers. Also, Mullokat demonstrated a troubling trend in donor-driven media. As a result of grants from the Eurasia Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy, Mullokat had been required to use its staff from the Russian language news program to produce a fairly tame periodic program on the Ferghana Valley and literally dozens of Public Service Announcements. As a result, the station no longer broadcasts news in Russian. The situation in Margilon was even worse. The station director appeared to have little interest in producing serious news programming, and he has reportedly had a poor record of showing the USAID-funded news exchange that Internews produces for the country. In general, this director did not appear to have a dedication to making his station a part of the “fourth estate” in Uzbekistan in contrast to the directors in Angren and Jizzak who exhibited this dedication. Finally, S-TV in Samarkand was the worst of all the independent television stations we visited. This station had substantial resources, which was in part due to its success in selling several tabloid newspapers throughout the country. It also seemed, however, that the station had significant links to the government, which brought its actual independence into question. When asked about self-censorship, the director of S-TV immediately went on the defensive and suggested that one could not talk about freedom of speech when Uzbekistan is under siege by terrorists. Furthermore, the Eurasia Foundation had just given a large grant of equipment to S-TV, suggesting once again that there must be better communication between donors with regard to media assistance. This television station did not deserve such a grant.

In terms of the business side of television in Uzbekistan, independent stations have grave difficulties. The deteriorating economic situation in the country makes the advertising market very small. Furthermore, many small businesses either do not see the advantage of advertising or feel that it will only make their business more visible to predatory tax authorities. Finally, most serious advertising is consumed by the state-owned nation-wide stations that can offer advertisers the ability to reach the entire country with one advertisement. This situation leaves most local independent television stations short-staffed and unable to produce a significant amount of their own programming. Most stations produce less than one hour of their own programming daily.

In general, therefore, the situation for independent television in Uzbekistan is tenuous at best. There is no nation-wide independent television. Local independent television stations are beholden to local authorities, have very little hope for serious advertising revenues, and are mostly allocated 10 meter frequencies which cannot be viewed on older Soviet television sets without a special antenna. On the positive side donor support has helped many independent television stations to upgrade their equipment, but this has at times also created conflicts that have taken stations away from work that they need to do for their viewers. The few independent television stations that have been successful in producing and disseminating alternative information to the public have done so largely because their leadership has shown great initiative.

4.3 Radio:

There are very few information-based independent radio stations in Uzbekistan, but it is potentially a fertile area to explore. The one independent radio station in the country that does consciously provide alternative information to its listeners is Radio Grande in Tashkent. This station is particularly important given that Tashkent presently has no independent television station. At our meeting with Radio Grande, we were very impressed with the variety of their informational programming, their willingness to push the envelope on information, and their future plans for the station. Radio Grande provides regular news and a series of different talk

shows (mostly funded by international donors). In mixing this informational programming with music, they are able to keep a significant audience and to evade serious pressure from the government. We did not encounter any other radio stations with a strong journalistic component to their work. Most stations, except the state-owned ones, seem to prefer a format of almost exclusively musical programming, which is very inexpensive to produce, does not create controversy, and brings in significant advertising revenue.

4.4 Newspapers:

There are no opposition newspapers in Uzbekistan. This greatly reduces the range of political viewpoints available in newspapers. Most newspapers are pro-governmental and state-owned. A visit to the state-owned Ferghana Oblast newspaper, “Ferghanskaya Pravda,” was much like a trip back into the Soviet period. It was run like a Soviet institution, had little journalistic initiative, and the majority of its material was reprinted from state-owned newspapers from Tashkent. Aside from such state-owned newspapers, the majority of other print media would be best categorized as tabloid and advertising organs. These include either classified based newspapers with scant human interest material or criminal investigation tabloids that focus on “non-political” crimes such as murder and rape. Aside from this majority of newspapers, there are still a few papers and print journalists in the country with potential. We visited one small business newspaper in Samarkand, *Bahs*, that appeared to have great potential. As is the case with the best television stations, the success of this newspaper appeared to be almost entirely due to the initiative of its editor and owner. The owner understood the principals of good journalism and felt that he was best able to practice honest journalism by concentrating on issues related to the economy and small business development. Given the politically sensitive nature of economic issues in Uzbekistan, however, the ability of this newspaper to be successful is more likely due to its small run that keeps it “under the radar screen” of authorities. The newspaper, for example, published significantly critical material about the Government of Uzbekistan in its edition about the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conference. Still, it did not experience any harassment as a result of these stories. As noted above, one of the only other truly independent newspapers in the country, *Mahiyat*, was forced to change its editor due to a poem with veiled criticism of the President that it had published. While we were not able to find any other truly independent and hard-hitting newspapers during our assessment, we did meet with at least one investigative journalist working at a State-owned newspaper in Tashkent who was interested in starting his own newspaper.

4.5 Media Advocacy:

There is obviously a great need for media advocacy in Uzbekistan. While media advocacy is a difficult endeavor, especially in Uzbekistan, there are surprisingly several groups in the country that are engaged in media advocacy in one way or another. The increasing number of human rights groups in the country that are assisted by the USAID-funded Freedom House program are often able to expose the harassment of journalists and media outlets. A USAID-funded project monitoring abuses of the rights of journalists and media outlets undertaken by the local affiliate of Internews in Uzbekistan is yet another source for exposing such abuses. Unfortunately, it still remains difficult to evaluate the impact of this project given that it has only begun to be active. In addition, there is one other local NGO, “The International In-Service Training Center for Journalists,” that does some work in the area of the protection of media rights. While this organization may be called upon to assist in general media advocacy campaigns once others are on-board, it appears to also have numerous connections throughout the political spectrum, likely hampering its willingness to initiate aggressive advocacy campaigns on its own. Finally, the

opening of a branch of the British NGO “Institute for War and Peace Reporting” (IWPR) offers one more means of media advocacy in the country. IWPR in Uzbekistan appears to be particularly aggressive in its advocacy activities and is a good addition to some of the softer advocacy undertaken by other international organizations. Unfortunately, there are presently no serious associations of media outlets in Uzbekistan to represent the interests of media holdings themselves. This may reflect the tenuous situation in which independent media outlets find themselves in the country. As a result, they are wary of directly becoming involved in advocacy campaigns.

4.6 Training:

While there are numerous opportunities for training available to journalists and media professionals in Uzbekistan, very little of this training is institutionalized locally and almost all of it is provided with foreign donor support. Local journalists and media professionals felt that local journalism schools were too theoretical and, thus, unable to truly prepare incoming employees. In the area of television, the USAID-funded Internews project remains the only major provider of technical training, but it has only just begun to institutionalize its training by cultivating a local cadre of trainers. In the area of newspaper journalism, there are multiple training providers in the donor community, but most of them provide only one-time trainings on discrete issues. The only exceptions to this were Internews’ partner, the “International Center for Journalists” (ICFJ), and the Swiss-funded Cimera organization. These two programs provide at least a more or less comprehensive training package to targeted newspaper professionals. In addition, there appeared to be some potential in the work of the local NGO, “The International In-Service Training Center for Journalists,” but this group also seemed to lack a comprehensive approach since it depends so much on the whims of the donors with whom it works.

4.7 Evaluation of the Performance of Internews in Uzbekistan:

The Internews program over the past two years has had mixed results, but it is also fair to say that it has had an impact that goes far beyond that which previous Internews projects have enjoyed in Uzbekistan. Internews’ training program continues to be a central part of its project and without a doubt fills an important need, especially among television journalists and professionals. The only serious drawback in this aspect of Internews’ work is that it still lacks any concrete mechanism for creating sustainable training provision in the country. Only recently has Internews begun to train local trainers with this in mind. Internews’ new nominal print media training program, which is implemented by ICFJ, is a worthwhile addition to the project and is probably at the level of effort and cost that it should be in Uzbekistan given the nascent nature of independent newspapers. Given that ICFJ has now tested the waters, however, it probably makes sense to focus this training more on the newspapers that we consider to have the most promise for development. Such an approach is likely to offer “more bang for the buck.”

In the past two years, Internews’ program has also exhibited a more proactive approach in the areas of production support, media advocacy, and network support. While having mixed ultimate results, the production grant fund implemented by Internews has been fairly successful in encouraging and facilitating the expansion of locally-produced informational programming. The grant fund’s primary shortcoming is that it has not encouraged media outlets either to push the envelope enough in the new programs they are producing or to provide concrete plans for how grant-funded programming will be sustained after the grant has expired. For this reason, any future media project in CAR should attempt to elicit more targeted programming for funding to ensure that this programming is really opening up the informational space in the country and,

if possible, has a sustained effect on this space. Internews' news exchanges ("Zamon" and "Open Asia"), however, do seem to be improving in this regard. The examples of these programs which we viewed did push the envelope on critical issues and did tend to help open up the informational space in the country. The primary shortcoming of this aspect of Internews' work is that it does not do enough to truly encourage local media outlets to adopt a more hard-hitting approach to their own news reporting. In the area of media advocacy, the locally-registered wing of Internews in Uzbekistan has begun a media monitoring program. While this program has just begun and, thus, has no measurable results to report, it is a proactive attempt to address media rights issues. Finally, the network development work with television stations, which is discussed extensively above in other sections of this report, is a particularly welcome proactive attempt by Internews to initiate movement in independent media where an opportunity exists.

In general, we found that Internews had done a very good job in fulfilling the work outlined in their present agreement with USAID and, in some cases, had even seized opportunities that are not envisioned in this agreement. That being said, we also felt that the difficulties of independent media in Uzbekistan may warrant more focus on the production of programs that are explicitly focused on informing the population about the policies and issues that influence their daily lives. Also, it was noted that increased work was warranted in the area of independent informational radio, which remains mostly undeveloped in the country outside of Tashkent's Radio Grande.

4.8 Bottom Line:

The bottom line is that independent media in Uzbekistan is in a tenuous position at present. On the one hand, it is unable to produce much of an alternative to the information provided by state-owned media, has little financial viability, and is under constant government pressure. On the other hand, the facts that progress is being made towards the development of an independent television network, that some outlets do indeed provide alternative information, and that there is an increasing abundance of media advocacy organizations in the country suggests that opportunities for progress do exist. The present situation could be a watershed in the future development of media in the country for many reasons. First, the present engagement between the USG and the GOU provides an opening in the development of democracy that must be fully exploited. Secondly, the availability of global media through the internet and cable/satellite television is increasing demand among people in Uzbekistan for better access to information. Finally, as the GOU begins to undertake economic reforms, it will be increasingly evident that it cannot afford to waste its scarce resources on state-owned media. In this context, USAID must take a more aggressive approach to the promotion of independent media in the country that includes support for capacity building, production support, and media advocacy.

APPENDIX A: PRIVATE ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA IN KAZAKHSTAN

A PARTIAL LIST OF PRIVATE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|-------------------------|---------------|---|--|
| Adal-TV | Atyrau | Laura Shalmanova, Director adal.tv@rambler.ru | info pending |
| Aktau Lada TV Orbita | Aktau | Alexander Babich, Director triada@mail.kz | info pending |
| Aktau Tandem Radio | Aktau | Serik Maktanov, Director tandem@atis.kz | FM-104.6 |
| Aktiv Studia | Aktau | Stanislav Tokmashov, Director aktiv-studio@mail.ru | info pending |
| Aktobe Radio | Aktobe | Natalya Bandrovskaya aktoberadio@fromru.com | FM-101.4 Since 1999 |
| Aktsent TV | Lisakovsk | Zulfiya Arefyeva, Director aktsent@fromru.com | info pending |
| Alau TV & Radio | Kostanay | Nokolai Zverkov, Director alau@kostanai.net | FM-100.7/Kazakh, Russian Since 1998 |
| Alva-TV | Zyryanovsk | Alexander Shalaputov, Director alvatv@mail.kz | info pending |
| Aray Plus | Taldykorgan | Makhabbat Bezheyeva, Director aray-plus@mail.ru | info pending |
| ASTV Television | Astana | Irina Chernolovskaya, Director info@astv.kz | Since 2003/Kazakh, Russian 20 staff |
| Avtoradio | Almaty | Zhanar Sarsenova, Director avtoradio@nursat.kz | FM-105.4 |
| Bayakov-TVK-6 | Semipalatinsk | Omarbek Bayuakov, Director tvk6@iftc.semey.kz | info pending |
| Channel 5 TV &Radio | Karaganda | Vitaly Zabarny, President 5channel@sys-pro.com | Since 1993/Kaz., Rus. 80 staff |
| Channel 31 | Almaty | Armanzhan Baytasov, Director arman@navigator.kz | Since 1993/Kaz., Rus. |
| Channel 31-Karaganda | Karaganda | Yevgeny Zavatsky, Director 31channel@sys-pro.com | Since 2001/Kaz., Rus. 10 staff |
| Channel 43 | Temirtau | Yevgeniy Zavatskiy, Director 43channel@mail.kz | info pending |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| Company TV-Art | Karaganda | Vadim Ni, Director cash@nursat.kz | info pending |
| Dlya Vzroslyh Radio | Astana | Irina Chernolovskaya 103.2FM@mail.ru | FM- 103.2 |
| Europe Plus Radio | Almaty | Gennady Vaschenkov, Director office@europaplus.kz | FM-107.0/Kazakh, Russian Covers 30 cities in KZ |
| Iman TV | Osakarovka | Sulumbek Mikayev, Director | info pending |
| Irbis TV & Radio | Pavlodar | Amangali Zhaksybayev, Director inbox@irbistv.kz | UKW-71.93 |
| Ispat-Sphera TV | Temirtau | Vladimir Golovach, Director sfera@ada.kz | info pending |
| Kalken TV (KTV-5) | Ust-Kame- nogorsk | Zhumaziya Baysalbayeva, Director ktv5@ukg.kz | info pending |
| Khabar News Agency | Almaty | Dariga Nazarbayeva, Chairman | Khabar & El Arna TV |
| Kogam TV | Kyzylorda | Shakizada Abdykarimov, President kogamtv@nets.kz | info pending |
| KTK TV | Almaty | Sergey Kleshenkov, Manager ktk@ktk.karavan.kz | Since 1991/Kaz., Rus |
| KTK-7 TV | Pavlodar | Mukhtar Tokpanov, Director ktk@pvl.kz | info pending |
| Kurchatvskoe TV | Kurchatovsk | Natalia Zhdanova, Director | info pending |
| Labris-TV-Plus | Ekibastuz | Ravil Khalikov, Director lab@mail.kz | info pending |
| Maksat Radio | Leninogorsk | Alima Esenova, Director | info pending |
| MIG TV | Talgar | Mikhail Chumin, Director | Since 1993/Russian 10-meter/transmitter 100W |
| Miks Radio | Ust-Kame- nogorsk | Yelena Medvedeva, Director mix7376@mail.ru | UKW-72.98 |
| Municipal TV & Radio Petropavlovsk | | Yevgeny Sazanov, Director tv6@petropavl.kz | UKW-71.93 |
| Nashe Radio | Almaty | Anton Buravlev, Director | FM-104.0 |
| NS Radio | Almaty | Viktor Novozhenov, Director vnovozhenov@ns.kz | FM-106.0 Since 1995 |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|---|--|
| NTK TV | Almaty | Anuar Salkimbayev, Director ntkmni@nursat.kz | Re-structured in 2002 |
| Otrar TV | Shymkent | Valentina Kulikova, Director otrar@nursat.kz | Since 1991/Kaz., Rus. 100 staff |
| Radio-102 | Temirtau | Sergey Davydov, Director radio@ada.kz | FM-102.0 |
| Rahat TV | Almaty | Darya Klebanova, President rakhattv@nursat.kz | Since 1993/Kaz., Rus. |
| Rauan Radio | Lisakovsk | Svetlana Nastenka, Director rauan@sunrise.kz | UKW-70.28 |
| Retro Radio | Almaty | Anatoly Gudyn, Director radio@ktk.caravan.kz | FM-91.7 Since 1999 |
| Rif Radio | Aktau | Oleg Alferyev, Director reef.kz@atis.kz | FM-107.1 |
| Rifma Radio | Aktobe | Vladimir Mikhaylov, Director rifma@aktobe.kz | FM-105.7 Since 1995 |
| Rika TV | Aktobe | Bandrovskaya Natalya, Director rikatv@nursat.kz | 10-meter/Kaz., Rus. Since 1991/112 staff |
| Russian Radio | Almaty | Ismail Igilmanov, Director office@rusradio.kz | FM-104.7 Since 1999 |
| Sairam TV | Shymkent | Yedylbai Berkynbayev, Director | info pending |
| Sana TV & Radio | Rudny | Yesengeldy Kuanyshpayev sanatv@mail.ru | FM-106.9 |
| Serik-TDK-42 | Uralsk | Svetlana Sakayeva, Director volkov42tdk@mail.ru | info pending |
| Shakhar TV & Radio | Almaty | Gulmira Aldiyarova, President shahar@lorton.com | info pending |
| Talap Radio | Uralsk | Vladimir Volkov, President t-shtern@mail.ru | FM-106.6 |
| Tan-Channel 31 | Almaty | Erzhan Baytasov, President tan_tv@kaznet.kz | info pending |
| Terra Radio | Karaganda | Kulyash Amanzholova, Director terra@mail.krg.kz | UKW-66.26 Since 1996 |
| TV-29 | Temirtau | Alexander Zharkov, Director tv29@mail.ru | info pending |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|--|-------------------------------|
| TV-Art Radio | Karaganda | Vadim Ni, Director cash@nursat.kz | FM-101.2/25 staff |
| TV Market | Zheskazgan | Dmitry Podovinnikov, Director tvmj@iftc.zhez.kz | info pending |
| TVS TV | Rudny | Lyudmila Starostina, Director tbc@krcc.kz | info pending |
| Volna TV | Ridder | Vladislav Khrebtov, Director vhrebtov@mail.ru | info pending |
| UMAKS Radio | Shymkent | Aitkul Tuleshova, Director umaks-shm@nursat.kz | FM-101.2 |

A PARTIAL LIST OF PRIVATE PRINT MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|---|--|
| Aigak | Shymkent | Dulat Abish, Director aigak-shym@nursat.kz | 50,000/Kazakh Since 1996 |
| Aina | Kostanay | Maria Saparova, Editor ainakar@mail.kz | info pending |
| Ak Zhayik | Atyrau | Abdilda Mukashev, Director A_mukashev@nursat.kz | 20,000 copies/once a week Kazakh |
| Akikat | Shymkent | Anar Bakirova, Editor | info pending |
| Almaty Akshamy | Almaty | Ergali Sagat, Editor Aksham@lorton.com | 10,800 copies/once a week Kazakh/City government |
| Ana Tili | Almaty | info pending | 15,430 copies/once a week Kazakh/State |
| Assandi Times | Almaty | Gusel Baidalinova, Director assandy@fromru.com | 20,000 copies/once a week Russian/ DVK Party |
| Avangard | Kostanay | info pending | info pending |
| Avia Transit | Karaganda | Kanat Zhumukova, Director aziatransit@valut-tranzit.kz | 15,000 copies/once a week Russian/Bank-owned |
| Avitrek | Karaganda | Nadezda Koreleva, Editor red@avitrek.krg.kz | 8,000 copies/once a week Russian |
| Bilim Zharysi | Kostanay | Gulnar Asanbaeva, Publisher bilim@mail.kz | 25,000 copies/once a week Kazakh/State University |
| Diapozon | Aktobe | Marina Vasileva, Editor vasileva@rifma.kz | 20,000 copies/once a week Russian |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------------|-------------|---|--|
| Djac Alash | Almaty | Amirkhan Mendekye, Editor | 66,000 copies/ once a week Kazakh/City government |
| Dosug | Astana | V. Opanasenko, Editor ATS_KZ@kepter.kz | 10,000 copies/once a week Russian |
| Edil Zhayik | Uralsk | Amanzhol Zeynullin, Editor | info pending |
| Epoha | Almaty | Tulegen Askarov, Editor epohapisma@mail.ru | 15,000 copies/once a week Russian/Ak Zhol Party |
| Evrika | Aktobe | Viktor Gerber, Editor evrika_news@nursat.kz | 8,000 copies/once a week |
| ExpressK copies/daily | Almaty | Kylyshbek Abykenov | 20,000 Russian |
| Info-Tess | Astana | Tatyana Karmenova, Director Info_tess@kepter.kz | 35,000 copies/once a week Bank-owned |
| Kazakh-kaya Pravda | Astana | A.Kostina, Editor kazpravda@kaznet.kz | 72,337 copies/daily Russian/Since 1920 |
| Kostanay Novosti | Kostanay | Sergei Kharchenko, Editor kstnews@kostanai.net | 24,000 copies/4 times a week Russian |
| Magnolia | Taraz | Lyudmila Lipko, Editor magnolia@tarazinfo.kz | 15,000 copies/once a week Russian/Since 1995 |
| Nachnem s Ponedel'nika | Almaty | Ramazan Esergepov, Editor esergepov@nursat.kz | 3,620 copies/ twice a week Kazakh, Russian |
| Novyi Vestnik | Karaganda | Olga Kraus, Editor vestnik@nursat.kz | info pending/once a week Russian |
| Panorama | Almaty | Lera Tsoy, Editor panorama@asdc.kz | 20,125 copies/once a week Russian/Since 1992/35 staff |
| Spektr | Semey | Omarbek Bayuakov, Founder tvk6@iftc.semey.kz | 28,000 copies/once a week Russian |
| Stolichnaya Zhizn' | Almaty | Oleg Kvyatkovskiy, Editor capital-life@nursat.kz | 27,300 copies/once a week Russian/Since 2000 |
| Stolicnyi Prospekt | Astana | Dastan Utebaev, Director stpro@kepter.kz | 10,00 copies/once a week |
| Tselina | Astana | Irina Musiyan, Editor alas-press@kepter.kz | 20,500 copies/once a week Russian/Since 1995 |
| Tvoi Shans | Kostanay | info pending adv@chance.kst.kz | 15,000 copies/once a week Russian/Since 1995 |

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|---------------------|-------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| Uralskaya Nedelya | Uralsk | Tamara Yeslyamova, Editor esliamova@mail.ru | 7,500 copies/once a week |
| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
| Vecheryi Almaty | Almaty | E. Pashina, Editor vechorka@nursat.kz | 27,400 copies/once a week Russian |
| Vremya | Almaty | Igor Meltser, Editor info@time.kz | 96,531 copies/once a week Russian |
| Vzglyad | Karaganda | Tamara Serikova, Manager tamara@vision.krg.kz | 9,500 copies/once a week Russian |

APPENDIX B: PRIVATE ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA IN KYRGYZSTAN

A PARTIAL LIST OF PRIVATE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|--------------------|----------------------|---|---|
| Avto Radio | Bishkek | Ulan Alybayev, Director autoradio@elcat.kg | FM-100.9/Kyrgyz & Russian Since March 2001 |
| Asia-Center Radio | Bishkek | Aleksei Lesnikov, Director echo@elcat.kg | FM-101.3/Russian/7 staff Since July 1998 |
| Almaz Radio | Bishkek | Rustam Koshmuratov, Director almaz@kynet.kg | FM-102.1/Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1992/ 5 staff |
| Almaz-Naryn Radio | Naryn | Jarkyn Ibraeva, Director | Kyrgyz, Russian, Turkish Since 2001/ 5staff |
| Anten TV | Karakol | Ibragim Ydyrov antentv@netmail.kg | Kyrgyz & Russian Since July 2002/ 8 staff |
| Ayan TV | Naryn | Kaken Barkyjokova, Director ayan_tv@ktnet.kg | Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1996/ 7 staff |
| Baktynur TV | Zhalalabad | Nurkan Koichumanov, Director | Kyrgyz, Russian, & Uzbek Since 1997/ 11 staff |
| Burana Radio | Tokmok | Anna Buturlakina burana@ktnet.kg | FM-107.6/ Russian Since July 2002/ 6 staff |
| Eho Manasa | Zhalalabad | Temirbek Toktogaziev | Kyrgyz & Russian Since March 2001/ 7 staff |
| EMTV | Karakol | Ruslan Osmonaliev emtv@issyk-kul.kg | Kyrgyz & Russian/ 20 staff Since September 1998 |
| Evropa Plus | Bishkek | Sergei Ogai, Director office@europa.kg | FM-101.7/Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1996 |
| Gulistan TV | Zhalalabad | A. Eshenkulova, Director | info pending |
| Keremet TV & Radio | Osh | Omorbek Abdiraimov keremetv@mail.ru | Since 1995/ 10 staff |
| KOORT TV | Bishkek Chui, Osh | Oleg Sitko, Director office@koort.kg | 5-meter/Kyrgyz & Russian Since June 1997/103 staff |
| Love Radio | Bishkek Chui | info pending radionews@koort.kg | FM-89.0/Russian Since September 2003/8 staff |
| LW Radio | Karakol | Urmil Urmanayev lw@issyk-kul.kg | Russian/ 5 staff Since November 1998 |
| Maks Radio | Bishkek Chui | Ruslan Saskeyev, Director radio@max.kg | FM-106/Russian Since May 1999/9 staff |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|----------------------|---|---|
| Manas FM | Bishkek | Seifettin Saglam, Director manasfm@manas.kg | FM-102.9/Kyrgyz & Turkish Since 2000/5 staff |
| Mars TV | Zhalalabad | Mira Tashmanova, Director | info pending |
| Mezon TV | Osh | Mamir Shakirov mezontv@osh.kg | info pending |
| National TV & Radio | Bishkek | Toktosh Aitikeeva, President snbckr@netmail.kg | 1 st meter/Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1958/1700 staff |
| NBT TV& Radio | Bishkek | Midin Konushbaev, Director nbt@infotel.kg | 10-meter/Russian Since November 1995/56 staff |
| NTS TV& Radio | Bishkek | Taalaibek Sagynov, Director | 10-meter/Russian Since 1995/120 staff |
| Nur TV | Zhalalabad | Gulbara Barpieva | info pending |
| O'Key Radio | Bishkek Chui | Beth Hendrickson, Director okradio@elcat.kg | FM-100.5/Kyrg., Russ., Eng. Since 1996 |
| Osh TV | Osh | Halilzhan Hudaiberdiev oshtv@oshmail.kg | Since March 1991 |
| Piramida Radio | Bishkek Chui, Osh | Andrei Tsvetkov, Director radio@pyramid.elcat.kg | FM-105.0/Russian Since June 1992/14 staff |
| Piramida TV | Bishkek Chui, Osh | Andrei Tsvetkov, Director tsvetkov@pyramid.elcat.kg | meter/Russian Since December 1991/52 staff |
| Retro Radio | Bishkek | Jamilya Yunusalieva, Director retro.kg@mail.ru | FM-88.5/Kyrgyz & Russian Since January 2002/7 staff |
| Hit FM Radio | Bishkek | Dmitri Gudkov, Director hitfm@mail.ru | FM-105.6/Russian Since September 1999/8 staff |
| Salam Radio | Batken | Maksuda Aitieva, Director rs@osh.kg | Kyrgyz & Russian/14 staff |
| Shankai TV | Naryn | Roza Jumaeva, Director shankay@ktnet.kg | Kyrgyz & Russian/10 staff Since November 2002 |
| Shanson Radio | Bishkek | Tofik Aliyev, Director shanson@infotel.kg | FM-107.8/Russian Since August 2000/10 staff |
| Syry-Ozon TV/Radio | Bishkek | Almazbek Abdrayev | Kyrgyz & Russian/21 staff Since 1991 |
| Talas Oblast TV | Talas | Toktogul Ibraimov | Kyrgyz/24 staff Since 1992 |
| Tatina Radio | Karabalta | Kalybek Dzhankeybekov tatina@karabalta.kg | FM-106.3/Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1996/6 staff |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|--|--|
| Tatina TV | Karabalta | Kalybek Dzhankymbekov tatina@infotel.kg | 10-meter/ Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1996/8 staff |
| Tenir-Too Radio | Naryn | Darygul Abdykerimova, Director tenir_too@netmail.kg | Kyrgyz & Russian Since 1999/3 staff |

A PARTIAL LIST OF PRIVATE PRINT MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|----------------------|-------------|--|--|
| Aalam | Bishkek | Cholponbek Abykeev, Editor aalamga@hotmail.kg | 15,000 copies/ twice a week Since 1991/ Kyrgyz/30 staff |
| Agym | Bishkek | Melis Eshimkanov, Editor agym@users.kyrgyznet.kg | 12,000 copies/ twice a week Since 1992/Kyrgyz/20 staff |
| Ai-Danek | Bishkek | Toktaiym Umentaliyev, Editor aidanek@elcat.kg | 20,000 copies/ once a week Since 1997/Kyrgyz, Russian |
| AIF Kyrgyzstan | Bishkek | Gennadyi Pavlyuk, Editor aif@mail.kg | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 2001/Russian/7 staff |
| Aikyn | Naryn | Ermek Tursunaliyev, Editor | 1,000 copies/once a month Since 2001/Kyrgyz/4 staff |
| Aiyl Turmushu | Baetovo | Omurbek Dooleev, Editor | 1,000 copies/once a month Since 1940/Kyrgyz/4 staff |
| Alai Tany | Gulcha | Zhibek Zhoroeva, Editor | 2,100 copies/once a week Since 1933/Kyrgyz/4 staff |
| Altyn Beshik | Batken | Erkin Eratov, Editor | 2,500 copies/ twice a month Since 2002/Kyr., Rus., Uzb. |
| Ata-Zhurt | Batken | Sabyrbek Myktybekov, Editor | 1,300 copies/once a week Since 1936/Kyrgyz/6 staff |
| AtBashi Zhanylyktary | Atbashi | Kurmanbek Sadybakasov, Editor | 1,000 copies/once a week Since 1935/Kyrgyz/5 staff |
| Bagyt | Bishkek | Myrzakat Tynaliyev, Editor | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 2002/Russian/3 staff |
| Batken Tany | Batken | Samidin Kurmushuyev, Editor | 3,300 copies/once a week Since 2000/Kyrgyz/15 staff |
| Bilim Bashaty | Naryn | Aziz Cholponbayev, Editor akcholpan@mail.ru | 3,000 copies/twice a month Since 2002/Kyrgyz/15 staff |
| Biznizmen Kyr-na | Bishkek | Liliya Chernetskaya, Editor | 800 copies/3 times a week Since 1997/Russian/3 staff |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|----------------------|-------------|---|---|
| Bliz-Info | Bishkek | T. Duishekeyev, Editor blizinfo@pisem.net | 10,000 copies/once a week Since 1996/Russian/8 staff |
| DAAT | Bishkek | Erkinbek Okumaliyev, Editor daatpost@rambler.ru | 50,000 copies/once a week Since 2002/Kyrgyz |
| DDD | Osh | Suinbek Jusupov, Editor Gazeta_ddd@netmail.kg | 1,000 copies/once a week Since 1999/Uzbek/5 staff |
| Delo Nomer | Bishkek | Viktor Zapol'skiy, Editor cactus@elcat.kg | 40,000 copies/once a week Since 1991/Russian/20 staff |
| Demokrat | Bishkek | Edil Baisalov, Editor coalitionnjo@infotel.kg | 2,000 copies/once a month Since 2002/Kyrgyz, Russian |
| Demos Times | Osh | Mahmud Kazakbayev, Editor | 1,100 copies/once a week Since 2000/Uzbek/6 staff |
| Dil | Zhalalabad | Zhorobek Bekelov, Editor | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 1993/Kyrgyz/10 staff |
| Dyikandar Unu | Naryn | Kubanychbek Zhumabayev, | 5,000 copies/once a month Since 1999/Kyrgyz & Russian |
| Faktor | Karakol | Ramiz Mamedov, Editor faktor_karakol@mail.ru | 1,000 copies/twice a month Since 1995/Russian/3 staff |
| Ferghana | Zhalalabad | Bakyt Orunbekov, Editor fergana@netmail.kg | 3,000 copies/once a week Since 2000/Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek |
| Issyk-kul Tur | Karakol | Chinara Dzhakshylykova Issyk-kul.tour@netmail.kg | 1,500 copies/once a week Since 2002/Russian/5 staff |
| Karakol'skaya Pravda | Karakol | Syrtpai Namazbekov, Editor | 1,000 copies/once a week Since 2003/Kyrgyz & Russian |
| Kut Bilim | Bishkek | Kubatbek Chekirov, Editor kutbilim@monk.bishkek.gov.kg | 6,000 copies/once a week Since 1953/Kyrgyz/13 staff |
| Kyrgyz Ordo | Bishkek | Beken Nazaraliev, Editor | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 1999/Kyrgyz/7 staff |
| Kyrgyz Ruhu | Bishkek | Duishenbiev A.D., Editor | 7,000 copies/once a week Since 1991/Kyrgyz/14 staff |
| Kyrgyz Tuusu | Bishkek | Abdilamit Matisakov, Editor tuusu@infotel.kg | 20,000 copies/twice a week Since 1924/Kyrgyz/50 staff |
| Limon | Bishkek | Venera Dzhamankulova, Editor limon@akipress.org | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 1994/Russian/20 staff |
| Litsa | Bishkek | Bermet Bukasheva, Editor bermetb@ns2.kyrgyznet.kg | 3,000 copies/ once a month Since 2000/Russian/1 staff |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|-----------------------|--------------|---|--|
| Moya Stolitsa-Novosti | Bishkek | Aleksandr Kim, Editor stolitca@infotel.kg | 23,000 copies/once a week Since 2003/Russian/50 staff |
| Obshestvennyi Reiting | Bishkek | Aibek Chekoshev, Editor pr_100@infotel.kg | 3,000 copies/ once a week Since 2000/Russian/7 staff |
| Ordo | Bishkek | Mamat Sabyrov, Editor | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 1997/Kyrgyz/3 staff |
| Osh Ekran | Osh | Abdulla Tashmurzayev | 3,000 copies/ once a week Since 2001/Kyrgyz, Russian |
| Piramida Plus | Bishkek | Bekzhan Derbeshev, Editor plus@infotel.kg | 40,000 copies/once a week Russian |
| Portret nedeli | Belovodskoye | Habira Mazhieva, Editor | 1,000 copies/once a month Since 2000/Russian/7 staff |
| Radius Iks | Karabalta | Radislav Safin, Editor | Since 2001/Russian/ Once a week |
| Region | Osh | Alisher Toksonbayev, Editor t_alisher@netmail.kg | 1,500 copies/once a week Since 2002/Kyrgyz, Russian |
| Rif-Obozrenie | Bishkek | Mezgil Isatov, Editor rif@uchkun.kg | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 1979/Russian/13 staff |
| RIO | Tokmok | N.Bondarenko, Editor | 5,000 copies/once a week Since 1997/Russian/6 staff |
| Slovo Kyrgyzstana | Bishkek | Alexandr Malevanyi, Editor slovo@infotel.kg | 7,000 copies/twice a week Since 1925/Russian/43 staff |
| Tribuna | Bishkek | Yrysbek Omurzakov, Editor tribuna@kyrnet.kg | 3,000 copies/twice a month Since 2000/Russian/9 staff |
| Tsivindem | Osh | Sanzhar Abdykadyrov, Editor absan@mail.ru | 1,000 copies/once a month Since 2000/Kyrgyz & Russian |
| Vasha Gazeta | Osh | Suiunbek Zhusupov, Editor | 2,000 copies/once a week Since 2002/Russian/3 staff |
| V Kontse Nedeli | Bishkek | Aleksandr Malyovannyi, Editor slovo@infotel.kg | 24,000 copies/once a week Since 1990/Russian/43 staff |
| Vechernyi Bishkek | Bishkek | Olga Bezborodova, Editor webmaster@vb.kg | 20,000 copies/5 times a week Since 1974/Russian/150 staff |

APPENDIX C: ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA IN TAJIKISTAN

NOTE: Due to the nature of media in Tajikistan, some of the media listed here is either partially or fully state owned.

A PARTIAL LIST OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|---|--|
| Asia Plus TV &Radio | Dushanbe | Umed Bobohonov, Director | Since 2002 |
| Azia TV & Radio | Khujand | Olim Koreev, Director +992(3422) 5-31-51 | Since 1998/Tajik |
| Anis TV | Konibodom | Kodir Mahmudov, Director + 992(3467) 3-57-03 | Since 1992/Uzbek, Tajik |
| Doro TV | Pandzhakent | Bozoboi Pulotov, Director + 992(3475) 5-34-61 | info pending |
| Gulakandoz TV | Gulakondozi | Kodirzhon Toshmanov, Director + 992 51131 | Since 1992/Uzbek, Tajik |
| Gulibodom TV | Konibodom | Akmal Aliev, Director orzu@konibodom.sugdien.com | Since 1998/Tajik |
| Johonoro TV | Chkalovsk | Mahmudjon Dodoboyev, Director + 992 (3451) 5-76-92 | 10-watts/Since 1991 Russian, Tajik |
| Isfara TV | Isfara | Mirzobahrom Boboyev, Director +992(3462) 2-14-6 | Reopened in 1998/Tajik |
| Kulob TV | Kulob | Safarli Ergashev, Director +992(3462) 2-14-6 | Since 1992/Tajik |
| Kurgonteppa TV | Kurgonteppa | Hurshed Safarov, Director ntrktv5@mail.ru | Since 2000/Tajik |
| Kurushkada TV | Istaravshan | Hussein Nurzuloyev, Director + 992 (3454) 2-15-79 | Since 1991/Tajik |
| Mavdzhi Ozod TV | Vose | Rustam Buriev, Director +992(3311) 2-22-08 | Since 2000/Tajik |
| NIS TV & Radio | Dushanbe | Kostnantin Parshin, Director kitkide@hotmail.com | info pending |
| Poitaht TV | Dushanbe | Rahmon Ostons, Director +992(372) 21-26-29 | 2 nd most important channel 49% state/Since 1996 |
| Regar TV | Tursunzoda | Habib Makbulov, Director regartv@mail.ru | Since 1993/16 staff 50 watts/Russian, Tajik |
| SM-1 TV | Khujand | Akram Uronov, Director cm1@sugdien.com | Since 1997/140 watts Russian, Tajik, Uzbek |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|--|--|
| Simo TV | Pandzhakent | Abdumuin Dzhirayev, Director +992(3475) 5-37-90 | Since 1992/Tajik |
| Samoniyon TV | Dushanbe | Irkomb Mirzoyev, Director +992(372) 33-05-42 | Reopened in 2001/Rus., Taj. |
| TadAz TV | Tursunzoda | Rauf Muminov, Director 25115zuhurovich@mail.ru | Since 2000/Rus., Taj., Uzb. |
| Tiroz TV & Radio | Khujand | Hurshed Ulmasov, Director trrktiroz@sugdien.com | 1 st indp. FM station Since 2001 |
| Ufushana TV | Istaravshan | Bahoromi Yusufzod, Director + 992 (3454) 2-19-80 | Since 1991/Tajik |
| Vatan TV & Radio | Dushanbe | Daler Omonov, Director www.radiovatan.com | 300 watts/ Taj., Rus. Since 2003 |

A PARTIAL LIST OF PRINT MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Anboz | Dushanbe | Tojiniso Sultonova, Editor +992 (372) 33-25-02 | 4,000 copies/Tajik |
| Asia Plus | Dushanbe | Marat Madshoev, Editor +992 (372) 33-05-42 | 6,000 copies/Russian Since 2000 |
| Badakhshon | Khorugh | Mirzoaziz Mirzokandov, Editor +992 (35220) 50-14 | 500 copies/Tajik |
| Bahori Ajam | Dushanbe | Sattor Tursun, Editor info pending | 100 copies/Tajik |
| Biznes i politika | Dushanbe | Rakhmon Ulmasov, Editor bisness_politika@ua.fm | 5,000 copies/Russian |
| Businessman | Dushanbe | Nurullo Fozilov, Editor +992 (372) 21-19-32 | 1,000 copies/Russian |
| Charhi Gardun | Dushanbe | Akbarali Sattorov, Editor gazeta@tojikiston.com | 3,800 copies/Tajik |
| Chatrri Simin | Khorugh | Qurbon Alamshoev, Editor +992 (35220) 45-39 | 300 copies/Tajik |
| Digest Press | Dushanbe | Akbarali Sattorov, Editor gazeta@tojikiston.com | 4,200 copies/Russian |
| Haqiqati Leninobod | Khujand | Rajab Dodojon, Editor +992 (3422) 6-47-36 | 1,500 copies/Tajik |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|-----------------------|-------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Javononi Tojikiston | Dushanbe | Rahim Saidaliev, Editor +992 (372) 23-38-01 | 3,000 copies/Tajik |
| Jumhuriyat | Dushanbe | Subhon Koshonov, Editor +992 (372) 33-08-11 | 14,284 copies/Tajik |
| Khalq Ovozi | Dushanbe | Djuraev, Editor +992 (372) 33-12-27 | info pending/Uzbek |
| Korvoni Umed | Istravshan | Sayfullo Mahkamov, Editor info pending | 2,000 copies/Tajik |
| Kurier Tajikistana | Dushanbe | Muhammad Toshtemirov, Editor ttemirov@td.silk.org | 4,500 copies/Russian |
| Leninabadskaia Pravda | Khudjand | Hafiz Saifulloev, Editor +992 (3422) 6-46-34 | info pending/Russian |
| Minbari Khalq | Dushanbe | Mansur Surush, Editor +992 (372) 33-72-10 | 15,000 copies/Tajik |
| Najot | Dushanbe | Zubaidullo Roziqov, Editor najot@tjinter.com | 1,700 copies/Tajik |
| Narodnaya Gazeta | Dushanbe | Vladimir Vorobiev, Editor info pending | 2,000 copies/Russian |
| Nerui Suhan | Dushanbe | Mukhtor Bokizoda, Editor Mukhtor@intaj.tajik.net | 1,000 copies/Tajik |
| Nilufar | Khudjand | Dodokhon Egamov, Editor +992 (3422) 6-34-81 | 5,000 copies/Tajik |
| Nushin | Dushanbe | Mirzo Asozoda, Editor mushin@cada.tajik.net | 1,000 copies/Tajik |
| Payomi Dushanbe | Dushanbe | Mukhtor Kukhsori, Editor +992 (372) 21-06-61 | 2,000 copies/Tajik |
| Ruzi Nav | Dushanbe | Rajabi Mirzo, Editor +922 (372) 35-47-80 | 6,000 copies/Tajik |
| Sadoi Mordum | Dushanbe | Bobodjon Abdulvohidov, Editor info pending | 6,912 copies/Tajik |
| Sughd | Khudjand | Abdumajid Bobodjonov, Editor sughd@khj.tajik.net | 3,000 copies/Tajik |
| Tirozi Jahon | Khudjand | Mavluda Sharipova, Editor +992 (3422) 4-30-48 | 1,500 copies/Tajik |
| Tojikiston | Dushanbe | Sharif Hamdam, Editor gazeta@tjinter.com | 17,000 copies/English, Tajik |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|---------------------|-------------|---|-------------------------------|
| Varurod | Khujand | Bobojon Ikromov, Editor gorez78@mail.ru | 1,500 copies/ Russian, Tajik |
| Vecherniy Dushanbe | Dushanbe | Akbarali Sattorov, Editor gazeta@tojikiston.com | 1,700 copies/Russian |

APPENDIX D: ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA IN UZBEKISTAN

NOTE: Due to the nature of media in Uzbekistan, some of the media listed here is either partially or fully state owned.

A PARTIAL LIST OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|------------------|----------|---|--|
| Ahborot | Tashkent | Bobur Alihonov, Director | info pending |
| Aloqa TV | Syrdarya | Azam Usmonov, Director | info pending |
| Andijan Youth TV | Andijan | Shuhrat Ahmedov, Director | info pending |
| Ekho Doliny | Fergana | info pending | info pending |
| Grande Radio | Tashkent | Ulughbek Tagaliev, Director | FM-101.5 |
| Istiqlol TV | Bukhara | Bahshullo Bozorov, Director | info pending |
| Mashal Radio | Tashkent | info pending | State-owned |
| Muloqot TV | Kokand | Burkhon Shermatov, Director | info pending |
| Sezam Radio | Tashkent | info pending | info pending |
| Tashkent TV | Tashkent | Nigmat Saidhanov, Director | info pending |
| Uzbek TV & Radio | Tashkent | Abdusaid Kuchimov, Director uztele@tki.uz | FM-104.5/Russian, Uzbek State-owned |
| Youth Channel | Tashkent | Hurshid Davron, Director | State-owned |

A PARTIAL LIST OF PRIVATE PRINT MASS MEDIA

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|------------------------|----------|--|-------------------------------------|
| Biznes Vestnik Vostoka | Tashkent | Vadim Sirotnin, Editor info@bvv.uz | 20,000 copies/Uzb., Rus. |
| Fidokor | Tashkent | Jaloliddin Safaev, Editor | 32,000 copies/Uzbek Since 1999 |
| Golos Uzbekistana | Tashkent | Andrey Orlov, Editor 133-11-49 | 40,000 copies/Russian Since 1918 |
| Hurriyat | Tashkent | Amirqul Karim, Editor 144-37-87 | 5,000 copies/Uzbek Since 1996 |
| Molodyozh Uzbekistana | Tashkent | I. Kasachev, Editor 133-41-52 | 6,000 copies/Russian Since 1926 |

| Media Outlet | City | Contact person/info | Additional information |
|----------------------|--------------|--|--|
| Mulkdor | info pending | Mirodil Abdurahmonov, Editor | 20,000 copies/Uzbek Since 1995 |
| Narodnoe Slovo | Tashkent | Abbos Usmonov, Editor slovo@uzpak.uz | 50,000 copies/Uzb., Rus. Since 1991 |
| Novosti Nedeli | info pending | Boris Babaev, Editor weeklynews@mnet.uz | 5,000 copies/Uzb., Rus. Since 1996 |
| Pravda Vostoka | Tashkent | Bakhtiyor Khasanov, Editor 133-58-61 | 20,000 copies/Russian Since 1917 |
| Savdogar | Tashkent | Mohamed Orazmetov, Editor | 17,000 copies/Uzbek Since 1992 |
| Tashkentskaya Pravda | Tashkent | Fathiddin Muhiddinov, Editor | 6,400 copies/Russian Since 1954 |
| Toshkent Haqiqati | Tashkent | Fathiddin Muhiddinov, Editor | 19,000 copies/ Uzbek Since 1954 |
| Uzbekiston Ovozi | Tashkent | Azim Suyun, Editor 133-38-55 | 40,000 copies/ Uzbek Since 1918 |

APPENDIX E: POLLS IN KAZAKHSTAN

These are samples from the answers to public polls commissioned by USAID/CAR each year in Kazakhstan. The charts provide a three-year perspective. Polls were taken in several cities around the country.

QUESTION 1: People usually get information about politics and government from different sources. How about you – what is the source that you rely on most getting information about politics and government.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Television | 93.2% | 94% | 97.1% |
| Local Newspapers | 47.4% | 44% | 47.3% |
| Radio | 28.9% | 25.7% | 29.1% |
| People, Friends, colleagues at work | 12.1% | 11% | 14.1% |
| Russian Newspapers | 11.7% | 9.5% | 10% |
| Internet | 2.5% | NA | 3.3% |
| Do not get news | 1.4% | NA | 1.1% |
| Other | 0.3% | NA | 0.2% |

QUESTION 2: Please, list TV channels you prefer to get news from.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| ORT (Russian state) | 73.8% | 67.2% | 67.1% |
| KTK (quasi ind.) | 35.9% | 46.2% | 53% |
| Khabar – 1 (quasi ind.) | 57.8% | 41.4% | 31.7% |
| NTV (Russian quasi ind.) | 21% | 21% | 18.4% |
| NTK (quasi ind.) | 4.4% | 7.1% | 8.4% |
| Channel 31 (Ind.) | 4.5% | 7.6% | 6.6% |
| Kazakhstan 1 (State) | 3.5% | 6.3% | 6.2% |
| RTR (Russian State) | 5.8% | 4.2% | 5.8% |
| Rahat (quasi ind.) | 3.9% | 6.1% | 5.5% |
| Khabar 2 (quasi ind.) | NA | 4.6% | 4.8% |
| Rika TV (local regional) | 3.8% | NA | 4.5% |
| TV-6 (Russian Ind.) | 7.6% | NA | NA |
| Kar TV (Channel 3) (local-regional) | NA | 3.1% | NA |
| Tan (ind.) | 2.8% | NA | NA |
| None/difficult to answer | NA | 3.9% | 2.9% |

QUESTION 3: What do you believe freedom of speech means?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say at home | 5.6% | 3.8% | 5.6% |
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say publicly, either in newspapers, on TV, or on the streets | 42.1% | 43.7% | 46.5% |
| Right to say whatever you want to say as long as it benefits the state | 22.8% | 23.1% | 19.5% |
| Right to say whatever you want to say as long as it does not offend anyone | 21.6% | 21.8% | 21.5% |
| Don't know | 7.8% | 7.6% | 6.9% |

QUESTION 4: Do you think that freedom of speech is being really present in your country?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Yes | 18.7% | 16.4% | 16.8% |
| Basically yes? | 11.7% | 12.2% | 13.6% |
| To some degree | 28.2% | 33.4% | 32.7% |
| Basically not | 11.4% | 12.5% | 12.2% |
| No | 26.3% | 21.6% | 21.8% |
| Do not know | 3.7% | 3.9% | 2.9% |

QUESTION 5: Do you believe that Media in your country should be free to criticize the government?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Yes | 81.9% | 78.9% | 79.0% |
| Some of them | 6.6% | 6.7% | 7.4% |
| No | 5.8% | 7.8% | 7.0% |
| Don't know | 5.7% | 6.6% | 6.6% |

APPENDIX F: POLLS IN KYRGYZSTAN

These are samples from the answers to public polls commissioned by USAID/CAR each year in Kyrgyzstan. The charts provide a three-year perspective. Polls were taken in Bishkek, Osh, Uzgen, and Naryn.

QUESTION 1: People usually get information about politics and government from different sources. How about you – what is the source that you rely on most getting information about politics and government.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|
| Television | 86% | 92.3% | 95.2% |
| Local Newspapers | 51% | 50.3% | 45.1% |
| Radio | 43% | 42.9% | 34.7% |
| People, Friends, colleagues at work | 35% | 19.8% | 20.9% |
| Russian Newspapers | 17% | 12.5% | 7.7% |
| Internet | 13% | 5.7% | 3.3% |
| Do not get news | 2% | 1.1% | 1.4% |
| Other | 10% | NA | NA |

QUESTION 2: Please, list TV channels you prefer to get news from.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|
| ORT (Russian state) | 67% | 76.1% | 62.6% |
| KTR (Kyrgyz state) | 50% | 50.2% | 60.8% |
| RTR (Russian State) | 48% | 56.4% | 38.1% % |
| Pyramida (ind.) | 17% | 18.7% | 21.2% |
| NTV (Russian quasi ind.) | 9% | 4.6% | 4.8% |
| KOORT (quasi ind.) | 12% | 10.6% | 19.7% |
| NBT (quasi Ind.) | 6% | 2% | NA |
| Naryn TV (local regional) | 3% | NA | NA |
| VOOST (quasi ind.) | 4% | NA | NA |
| TVTS (Russian quasi ind.) | 1% | NA | NA |
| Asman TV (ind.) | 2% | NA | NA |
| Osh – TV (local regional) | 5% | 14% | 10.7% |
| UZ-TV (Uzbek state) | 7% | 3.3% | 1.2% |
| TV-6 (Russian Ind.) | 7% | NA | NA |
| Yoshlar (Uzbek State) | 6% | 3.2% | 2.1% |
| Jalalabad TV (local regional) | 0.01% | NA | NA |
| CNN | 2% | NA | 0.1% |

QUESTION 3: What do you believe freedom of speech means?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|--|------|-------|-------|
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say at home | 5% | 7% | 6.2% |
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say publicly, either in newspapers, on TV, or on the streets | 47% | 44.7% | 39.3% |
| Right to say whatever you want to say as long as it benefits the state | 23% | 23.9% | 21.9% |
| Right to say whatever you want to say as long as it does not offend anyone | 18% | 20.6% | 24.2% |
| Don't know | 7% | 3.9% | 6.9% |

QUESTION 4: Do you think that freedom of speech is being really present in your country?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------|------|-------|-------|
| Yes | 10% | 27.3% | 36.4% |
| Basically yes? | 19% | 19% | 12.4% |
| To some degree | 37% | 28.7% | 21.8% |
| Basically not | 18% | 8.8% | 9.9% |
| No | 11% | 14.4% | 16.1% |
| Do not know | 5% | 2% | 3.3% |

QUESTION 5: Do you believe that Media in your country should be free to criticize the government?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|--------------|------|-------|-------|
| Yes | 56% | 76.7% | 74.7% |
| Some of them | 21% | 8.2% | 10.8% |
| No | 14% | 11.4% | 8.0% |
| Don't know | 9% | 3.7% | 6.5% |

APPENDIX G: POLLS IN TAJIKISTAN

These are samples from the answers to public polls commissioned by USAID/CAR each year in Tajikistan. The charts provide a three-year perspective. Polls were taken in Dushanbe, Khojand, and Kurghan Teppa.

QUESTION 1: People usually get information about politics and government from different sources. How about you – what is the source that you rely on most getting information about politics and government.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Television | 92,8% | 94% | 97.7% |
| Local Newspapers | 45,3% | 44.5% | 44.8% |
| Radio | 40,7% | 38.7% | 43.5% |
| People, Friends, colleagues at work | 29,6% | 24.8% | 20.5% |
| Russian newspapers | 32,7% | 20.3% | 12.7% |
| Internet | 5,1% | 4.2% | 3.9% |
| Do not get news | 3,1% | 1.6% | 1.1% |
| Other | 0,6% | 0.3% | NA |

QUESTION 2: Please, list TV channels you prefer to get news from.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| RTR | 79.4% | 43.1% | 70.1% |
| ? RT | 71.7% | 47.3% | 14% |
| ? V? | 43.1% | 72.1% | 62.8% |
| ? V-6 | 1.5% | NA | NA |
| ? V-Poitakht | 3.5% | NA | 6.3% |
| N? V | 2.3% | NA | 3.5% |
| ? V-201 | 0.1% | NA | NA |
| ? N? | 0.1% | NA | NA |
| Asia | 8.0% | 8.2% | 20.7% |
| ? V Sugd | 4.1% | 3% | 2.1% |
| ? ? 1 | 10.3% | 8.4% | 18.9% |
| Djakhonoro | 0.1% | NA | NA |
| ? NN | 0.0% | NA | NA |
| ? V Kurgan-tube | 0.0% | NA | NA |
| Do not watch TV News | NA | 2.2% | NA |

QUESTION 3: What do you believe freedom of speech means?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say publicly, either in newspapers, TV, or on the streets | 6.0% | 9.5% | 36.3% |
| Right to say whatever you want as long as it benefits the state | 39.7% | 24.9% | 20.8% |
| Right to say whatever you want as long as no one is offended | 30.4% | 19.8% | 17.7% |
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say at home | 19.7% | 20.8% | 6.8% |
| Do not know | 4.2% | 25% | 18.4% |

QUESTION 4: Do you think that freedom of speech is being really present in your country?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Yes | 14.3% | 18.9% | 21.7% |
| Yes in general | 11.9% | 11.7% | 22.7% |
| To some extent | 30.7% | 31.5% | 35.8% |
| No in general | 17.6% | 11.9% | 6.9% |
| No | 22.9% | 13.3% | 7.6% |
| Do not know | 2.6% | 12.8% | 5.3% |

QUESTION 5: Do you believe that Media in your country should be free to criticize the government?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Yes | 61.1% | 50% | 40.6% |
| Yes in general | 18.8% | 19.4% | 29.2% |
| To some extent | 15.0% | 15.5% | 17.2% |
| No in general | 5.1% | 15.1% | 13% |

APPENDIX H: POLLS IN UZBEKISTAN

These are samples from the answers to public polls commissioned by USAID/CAR each year in Uzbekistan. The charts provide a three-year perspective. Polls were taken in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Ferghana.

QUESTION 1: People usually get information about politics and government from different sources. How about you – what is the source that you rely on most getting information about politics and government.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|
| Television | 91.7 | 94.6% | 95.3% |
| Local Newspapers | 36.8 | 36.4% | 34.5% |
| Radio | 21.9 | 27.2% | 26.8% |
| People, Friends, colleagues at work | 9.5 | 13.3% | 17.4% |
| Russian newspapers | 10.3 | 10.1% | 7.5% |
| Internet | 0.7 | 1.1% | 1.6% |
| Do not get news | 2.7 | 2% | 2% |
| Other | NA | NA | NA |

QUESTION 2: Please, list TV channels you prefer to get news from.

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|------|
| <i>ORT</i> | 61.7% | 55.7% | 48.7 |
| <i>UzTV-2</i> | 47.3% | 13.9% | 0.5 |
| UzTV-1 | 43.7% | 39.1% | 42.2 |
| TV 6 | 23.4% | 0.2% | 0.5 |
| Oblast TV | 13.4% | NA | NA |
| RTR | 12.5% | 20.9% | 18.8 |
| NTV | 9% | 8.8% | 11.7 |
| UzTV-4 | 9% | 7.4% | NA |
| Other Russian TV channels | 3.8% | NA | NA |
| Other | 1.2% | NA | NA |
| No TV-set | 2.1% | 1.7% | 1.9 |
| Don't watch the news | 2.5% | NA | 2.5 |
| Difficult to answer | 0.3% | NA | 0.9 |

QUESTION 3: What do you believe freedom of speech means?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say publicly, either in newspapers, TV, or on the streets | 7.1% | 8.3% | 30.7% |
| Right to say whatever you want as long as it benefits the state | 22.6% | 26.2% | 27.8% |
| Right to say whatever you want as long as no one is offended | 29.5% | 23.3% | 21.7% |
| Right to say whatever positive or negative about government you want to say at home | 21.9% | 22.5% | 8.8% |
| Do not know | 18.9% | 19.7% | 11.1% |

QUESTION 4: Do you think that freedom of speech is being really present in your country?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Yes | 44.8% | 35.8% | 29.4% |
| Yes in general | 10.6% | 12.4% | 13.6% |
| To some extent | 20.5% | 19.3% | 22.1% |
| No in general | 4.6% | 7.1% | 8.2% |
| No | 11.6% | 16.4% | 20.4% |
| Do not know | 7.8% | 9% | 6.3% |

QUESTION 5: Do you believe that Media in your country should be free to criticize the government?

| Answer | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Yes | 67.6% | 59.5% | 68% |
| Yes in general | 15.7% | 20.9% | NA |
| To some extent | 4.3% | 7.4% | 4.4% |
| No in general | 12.4% | 12.3% | 18.1% |